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
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(Part C) 80-

TITLE: INTERNAL SITUATION IN JORDAN

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Regy		20/6	Regy.			Regy		3/9
C.W.L.	80-83	30/6	Mr Khandafis bank to cur		14/8		122	31/9
Regy		3/7	P.H.	103	17/8	Regy		4/9
C.W.L.	84	3/7	Regy		17/8	C.W.L.	127	4/9
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A.C.D.M.	96		Mr Trapp		1/9			
C.C.D.	nm	7/8	Mr Makman					
R		16/8	Regy.					
A.C.D.M.	102	10/8	C.W.L.	112	2/9			
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R		13/8	Regy		3/9			
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OTHER RELATED FILES:

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
14 JUNE, 1970

RECEIVED IN
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NE J1/4

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 287 (140840Z) DATED 14 JUNE 1970
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE MOD D14 JIS (NE) JIS GULF
HQBFNE BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD TRIPOLI WASHINGTON AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

14 *3/15*
MY TEL NO 280: INTERNAL SITUATION REPORT.

CONDITIONS IN THE TOWN ARE SLOWLY IMPROVING AND BANKS AND
MORE SHOPS ARE OPENING.

2. THE MAIN RISKS TO STABILITY ARE NOW REPRESENTED BY DIS-
AFFECTED TROOPS AND/OR UNITS WHO ARE STILL LOYAL TO SHERIF NASSER
AND BY LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS.

A SERIOUS BREAKDOWN IN THE CEASEFIRE WAS NARROWLY AVERTED YESTERDAY
AFTERNOON WHEN AN ARMY BRIGADE MOVED TOWARDS THE TOWN WITH THE
EVIDENT INTENTION OF ATTACKING THE WAHDAT CAMP. THEY
WERE STOPPED ONLY BY THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION ON THE SPOT OF
THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF.

3. AMMAN RADIO ANNOUNCED LATER THAT KING HUSSEIN
HAD APPOINTED THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF, ARAFAT, VICE-PRSIDENT AMMASH OF
IRAQ AND FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTAFLIOA OF ALGERIA TO ADVISE HIM ON
THE SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. ONE OF HIS OBJECTS, WE ASSUME
WAS TO TURN THE FLANK OF THE LEFT-WING OF THE
FEDAYEEN BY ASSOCIATING MODERATE AND HIGHLY RESPECTED LOCAL
LEADERS (JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN) WITH TWO ARAB LEADERS WITH
IMPECCABLE REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. IT ALSO CONSTITUTES A MOVE
BY THE KING TO GET HIMSELF BACK INTO THE CENTRAL BALANCING POSITION.
A JOINT WORKING PARTY HAS BEEN SET UP TO GET MUNICIPAL AND OTHER
PUBLIC SERVICES WORKING AGAIN AND PASC ARE REPORTED TO BE CALLING
IN CAPTURED CARS.

14.

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4. THE GENERAL MOOD OF THE PEOPLE IS NERVOUS, AND WHEN SO MANY ARE BEREAVED OR HAVE LOST THEIR POSSESSIONS THERE ARE BOUND TO BE AT LEAST OCCASSIONAL OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE. THE BEST ONE CAN SAY IS THAT LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH OUTBREAKS ESCALATING INTO A GENERAL CONFRONTATION HAVE BEEN REDUCED.

5. COMMUNICATIONS. TELEX AND TELEGRAPH SERVICES ARE OPEN BUT WITH SOME DELAY OF TRAFFIC. AMMAN AIRPORT CONTRARY TO B B C HAS REMAINED OPEN.

DEFCOMCEN PAS IMMEDIATE TO MOD D14 JIS(NE) JIS GULF AND HQBFNE

FCO PAS IMMEDIATE DEFCOMCEN WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN-CLAIR
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO. 348

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

29 JUNE 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

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3015

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 348 DATED 29 JUNE 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO BEIRUT CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV
WASHINGTON TRIPOLI MOD D14 JIS(NE) BAGHDAD JEDDA KUWAIT PARIS AND
MOSCOW.

F 79

MY TELEGRAM NO 345 OF 27 JUNE:

JORDAN CABINET CHANGES

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29 JUN 1970
NEJ1/4

THE FOLLOWING CABINET WAS ANNOUNCED ON 27 JUNE :-

(1) 'ABDUL MUN'IM AL-RIFAI	PRIME MINISTER
(2) 'AKIF AL-FAYEZ	MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRIME MINISTERIAL AFFAIRS
(3) 'ABDUL WAHAB AL-MAJALI	MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRIME MINISTERIAL AFFAIRS AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
(4) SALEH AL-MU'ASHER	MINISTER FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND LABOUR
(5) DR.QASIM AL-RIMAWI	MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR FOR MUNICIPAL AND RURAL AFFAIRS AND MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE
(6) DR. SUBHI AMIN AMR	MINISTER OF HEALTH, AND MINISTER OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
(7) ANTON ATALLAH	MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(8) DHOUQAN AL-HINDAWI	MINISTER OF EDUCATION
(9) SHEIKH 'ABDUL HAMID AL-SA'IH	CHIEF JUSTICE AND MINISTER FOR ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

(10) MAJ-GEN

(10) MAJ-GEN RASHID 'AREIQAT	MINISTER OF TRANSPORT
(11) NAJIB IRSHEIDAT	MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS
(12) FAWWAZ AL-ROUSAN	MINISTER OF JUSTICE
(13) DR MOHAMMED AL-FARA	MINISTER OF CULTURE, INFORMATION TOURISM AND ANTIQUITIES
(14) DR DAWOUD AL-HUSSEINI	MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY
(15) 'ABDUL QADER TASH	MINISTER OF FINANCE
(16) SULEIMAN AL-HADIDI	MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
(17) JA'FAR AL-SHAMAI	MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS.

2. ONLY THREE MINISTERS (SALEH AL-MU'ASHER, SUBHI AMIN AMR, AND DHOUQAN AL-HINDAWI) REMAIN IN THEIR PREVIOUS JOBS. A FURTHER THREE (MUN'IM AL-RIFA'I, RASHID 'AREIQAT AND NAJIB IRSHEIDAT) REMAIN IN THE CABINET WITH NEW JOBS. THE REMAINING ELEVEN MINISTERS ARE ALL NEW: INDEED SIX OF THEM HAVE NOT HELD OFFICE IN ANY PREVIOUS CABINET. THESE ARE FAWWAZ AL-ROUSAN (JUSTICE), A FORMER GOVERNOR OF AMMAN: MOHAMMED AL-FARA (CULTURE AND INFORMATION), A FORMER HEAD OF THE JORDANIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS: DAWOUD AL-HUSSEINI (NATIONAL ECONOMY), FORMER DEPUTY OF JERUSALEM, DEPORTED FROM THE WEST BANK BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES: 'ABDUL QADER TASH (FINANCE), A DEPUTY IN 1958 AND A BANKER: SULEIMAN AL-HADIDI (INTERIOR), THE PRESIDENT OF THE JORDAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AND JA'FAR AL-SHAMAI (PUBLIC WORKS), THE PRESIDENT OF THE ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION WHO SERVED FORMERLY WITH THE JORDAN ROYAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

AMMAN TELEGRAM NO.348 TO FCO.

-3-

3. THE MOST NOTABLE DEPARTURES, APART FROM TALHOUNI HIMSELF, ARE SALAH ABU ZEID (CULTURE AND INFORMATION), LT. GENERAL ALI AL HIYARI (DEFENCE) AND AHMED TONQAN (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER).

4. SEVEN OF THE NEW CABINET MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE NEW MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, SIGNED STATEMENTS DURING THE RECENT CRISIS SUPPORTING CERTAIN OF THE FEDAYEEN'S DEMANDS.

5. SEE M.I.F.T.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS

SIR P. ADAMS

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 349

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
29 JUNE 1970

RECEIVED IN
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29 JUN 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 349 DATED 29 JUNE 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ROUTINE BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK TRIPOLI BAGHDAD JEDDA KUWAIT PARIS MOSCOW MOD D14 AND JIS(NE)

M.I.P.T. JORDANIAN CABINET.

P~ a~ 3015

THIS IS WHAT PASSES FOR A STRONG CABINET. IT INCLUDES SUPPORTERS OF MOST OF THE MAIN FACTIONS IN JORDANIAN POLITICS E.G. MAJALI AS A SUPPORTER OF WASFI TEL, MUASHER AND TASH SUPPORTERS OF NABULSI, HADIDI A BAATHIST AS WELL AS TWO SENIOR PALESTINIANS, ATALLAH AND HUSSEINI, WHO HAVE HITHERTO REFUSED OFFICE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH "LAPSED" WEST BANKERS. THE MUCH DISLIKED MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ABU ZEID, IS REPLACED BY MOHAMMED EL FARRA, FORMERLY HEAD OF THE JORDANIAN MISSION IN THE U.N. HE AND 6 OTHERS ARE PALESTINIANS.

2. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW WELL THIS SOMEWHAT DISPARATE GROUP CAN PULL TOGETHER. RIFAI IS NOT A GOOD TEAM CAPTAIN AND SOME INTERNAL SQUABBLING SEEMS INEVITABLE. BUT FIRST PUBLIC REACTIONS ARE ENCOURAGING AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT CAN CLAIM TO HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN SECURING THE REPLACEMENT OF SOME OF THOSE WHOM THEY PARTICULARLY DISLIKED BY SEVEN SUPPORTERS. HOWEVER, BOTH ARAFAT AND HABASH ARE SAID TO HAVE REFUSED COMMENT SO FAR.

DEFCOMCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD D14 AND JIS(NE)

see 90

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EN CLAIR
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO. 351

TO F . C . O . LONDON
29 JUNE 1970.

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ADRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 351 DATED 29 JUNE 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON MOD D14 JIS(NE) BAGHDAD KUWAIT JEDDA TRIPOLI PARTS
AND MOSCOW.

MY TELEGRAM NO 348: JORDAN CABINET CHANGES:-

30/5

KING HUSSEIN HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO THE NEW PRIME MINISTER
ABDEL MUNIM AL-RIFAI, THE MAIN POINTS OF WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) "JORDAN HAS CONTINUED TO CALL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 1967 BUT TIME HAS SHOWN THAT
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION HAS BECOME A MIRAGE, BECAUSE
OF THE OBDURACY, CONCEIT AND EXPANSIONIST AIMS OF THE ENEMY,
AND OF THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE FORCES OF EVIL IN THE WORLD FOR
THE ENCROACHMENT ON ARAB LAND . THE ONLY SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO
US IS THAT WHICH RESTORES TO US ALL THE USURPED ARAB LAND AND
ENSURES THE UNDIMINISHED RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLE.
IN VIEW OF THIS REALITY WE MUST CONCENTRATE ON AN IMMEDIATE PREP-
ARATION FOR THE BATTLE OF LIBERATION. WE HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE NOW".
ALL THE FORCES OF THE NATION MUST BE MOBILISED AND EVERY ATTENTION
PAID TO THE ARMED FORCES. " IN PARTICULAR IT IS NECESSARY TO
CONTINUE TO PROVEDE THEM (THE ARMED FORCES) WITH THE REQUIRED
QUANTITIES OF MODERN ARMS FROM ANY SOURCE".

(B) THE KING CALLED FOR NATIONAL UNITY TO ENSURE FOR THE ARMY
OF THE FRONT LINE, AND FOR THE ACTIVE COMMANDOS, THE SUPPORT OF
THE PEOPLE. THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROTECT NATIONAL UNITY FROM
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSPIRACIES.

(C) JORDAN MUST CONTINUE TO CALL FOR ARAB COOPERATION IN THE
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS. (D) THE

LAST REF	
NEXT REF	

(D) THE NATIONAL ECONOMY MUST BE ADAPTED TO THE PURPOSES OF THE BATTLE.

(E) THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SAFEGUARD THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS, AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE. THERE MUST BE CONSULTATION WITH ORGANISATIONS AND SOCIETIES, SUCH AS CO-OPERATIVES, CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND TRADE UNIONS. THE GOVERNMENT MACHINE MUST SERVE THE PEOPLE IN A SPEEDY, HONEST AND ACCURATE MANNER, AND COMBAT CORRUPTION.

2. FULL TEXT WILL BE SENT BY BAG OF 30 JUNE.
FCO PASS ROUTINE TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

SIR P ADAMS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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
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IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 359

SECRET.

(TIME FACTOR 1100 GMT).

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

2 JULY 1970.



PM
3/7

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 359 DATE 2 JULY 1970 REPEATED INFORMATION TO PRIORITY MOD DI4 JIS(NE) BEIRUT CAIRO TELAVIV AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD TRIPOLI WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

~~FCO~~ NEJ 118 ~~FO~~

MY TELEGRAMS NO 312 AND 338 (NOT TO ALL):

JORDAN INTERNAL.

ON THE MORNING OF 2 JULY AMMAN IS OUTWARDLY CALM. IN THE PAST FEW DAYS UNITS OF THE JORDAN ARMY HAVE BEEN MOVED IN UNOBTRUSIVELY TO OCCUPY A FEW KEY POINTS SUCH AS TELEPHONE EXCHANGES. NUMBERS OF ARMED FEDAYEEN ARE STILL ON THE STREETS BUT MANY HAVE NOW REMOVED THEIR UNIFORMS THUS MAKING IMPOSSIBLE THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ORGANISATIONS TO WHICH THEY BELONG. ALTHOUGH THE UNDERLYING SITUATIONS CONTINUES TENSE WE ARE RECEIVING REPORTS FROM DIFFERENT QUARTERS THAT LAST MONTH'S FIGHTING CAUSED WIDESPREAD DISMAY AND A FEELING THAT THERE MUST BE NO REPETITION.

2. YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED FROM SECRET SOURCES A REPORT INDICATING THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS INDICATED THAT IF CURRENT EFFORTS TO REACH A MODUS VIVENDI BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDAYEEN ARE FRUITLESS,

HE WILL BE OBLIGED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN GROUPS. THERE IS A CLEAR RISK OF THIS. BUT FOR THE MOMENT IT APPEARS THAT THE KING IS MAKING A STRENUEOUS BID TO RE-ESTABLISH NATIONAL UNITY - CF. THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW CABINET AND HIS MESSAGE TO THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER (MY TELEGRAMS NOS 349 AND 351).

3. NEVERTHELESS THE KING'S HOPES THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE OPERATION OF THE FOUR MAN COMMITTEE WOULD ESTABLISH THE STABLE BASIS WHICH HE NEEDS FOR SUCCESS HAVE NOT YET BEEN REALISED. I BELIEVE THAT THE MODERATE FEDAYEEN WOULD STILL LIKE TO SEE THIS DEVELOPMENT. BUT THE DILEMMA FOR ARAFAT MUST BE THAT IF HE IS SEEN TO BE TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT HE WILL LOSE POPULAR SUPPORT: AND TO GUARD AGAINST A MAJOR SWING OF SUPPORT TO P.F.L.P. OR OTHER LEFT WING GROUPS HE MAY HAVE TO MOVE HIMSELF TO THE LEFT. THIS WOULD MEAN A DEPARTURE FROM THE APOLITICAL STANCE WHICH HE HAS HITHERTO ADOPTED AND WHICH I BELIEVE TO HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF STRENGTH TO HIM.

4. TO SUM UP, THE NATURAL TENDENCY OF ARABS TO FALL INTO RIVAL POLITICAL GROUPS IS AGAIN APPARENT HERE AND IS WORKING AGAINST THE CREATION OF THE KIND OF STABILITY BASED ON AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THE FEDAYEEN WHICH OFFERS THE KING THE BEST HOPE NOT ONLY OF CONTAINING THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT BUT ALSO OF PRESERVING HIS STATE. HE CANNOT NOW OPPOSE THE FORCES OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM, BUT HE WILL FEEL BOUND TO OPPOSE THE FORCES OF REVOLUTION. IF THESE TWO FORCES COMBINE HIS OUTLOOK WILL BE VERY BLEAK AND HE MAY BE TEMPTED TO TAKE DESPERATE ACTION. UNLESS (E.G. THROUGH THE OPERATION OF THE FOUR MAN COMMITTEE) OTHER ARAB STATES CAN COOPERATE WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVT IN CONTAINING THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES THESE MAY ULTIMATELY TRANSFORM THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN JORDAN. AT LEAST ONE REPORT SAYS THAT THE 4 MAN COMMITTEE HAVE PROMISED THEIR SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT

FCO PASS PRIORITY DEFCOMCEN AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD TRIPOLI WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD D14 AND JIS(NE)

(SENT TO D.C.C.)

SIR P ADAMS

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DEFENCE D

JORDAN PRESS EXTRACTS,
Sunday, 28.6.1970

NE J1/4

Headlines:-

Ad-Dustour: King Hussein accepts the resignation of the Talhouni Cabinet and Sayid Abdul Munem al Rifai forms a new Cabinet. (Repeated in Ad-Difaa, Al-Urdun and Al-Aqsa).

King Hussein receives Sayid Qayed Ahmad. (Repeated in Al-Urdun).

Ad-Difaa : Tension on the front-line between Syria and the enemy.

Al-Urdun : The UAR Foreign Minister received the American proposals five days before their announcement by the U.S. Secretary of State.

Al-Aqsa : Text of the royal decree ordering the formation of the new Cabinet.

Fateh : Sayid Qayed Ahmad calls on the Arab nation to support the Palestine revolution.

Sawt-al-Jamahir : Israeli attacks on Jordan.

Ad-Dustour, Ad-Difaa, Al-Urdun and Al-Aqsa

Formation of a new Cabinet

Amman: JNA: King Hussein yesterday accepted the resignation of the Talhouni Government and asked Sayid Abdul Munem al Rifai to form a new Government. In the Royal Letter of Assignment, King Hussein outlined the policy of the new Government as follows:

1- Jordan has continued to call for implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November, 1967. Time has shown that the implementation of this resolution has become a mirage because of the obduracy, conceit and expansionist aims of the enemy and of the support given by the forces of evil in the world for the encroachment on Arab land. The only solution acceptable to us is that which restores to us all the usurped Arab land and ensures the rights of the Palestinian Arab people undiminished. In view of this reality, we must concentrate on an immediate preparation for the battle of liberation. We have no other choice now. It is necessary to mobilize all forces and potentialities for the battle. The Government must raise the level of mobilization above differences and current conflicts to achieve the greater aim of liberation. Our mobilization will not succeed and bear fruit unless the military effort and commando action are joined together in a brotherhood in arms, which must be levelled at the enemy. This mobilization will succeed only if the citizen backs this cohesion and if agreement exists among all citizens.

Every attention should be paid to the armed forces, which must be provided with all material and other resources with the object of raising their technical qualifications and morale and enabling them to discharge their sacred task in the battle of liberation. In particular, it is necessary to continue to provide them with the required quantities of modern arms from any source. The military plan must be accurate and clear. It must determine the positive and effective roles of all the bodies operating on the field

Formation of a new Cabinet(Cont'd)

through freedom, escalation and unification of commando action and its complete cooperation with general military action.

2. All elements of the people must rally round the aim of liberation in a comprehensive national unity that will end all differences and sectarianism in the melting-pot of mobilization and joint effort.. Through this unity, the army on the front-line and active commandos will be sure of the support of the people. To attain this national unity, all legislative, executive and popular organisations must work for repairing the rift, removing doubts and establishing confidence between the people and the authority on all levels.. It is the duty of the Government to protect national unity from internal and external conspiracies.
3. Jordan always calls for Arab cooperation in the military, political and economic fields for purposes of the battle of liberation and destiny. She calls for continuing Arab meetings on all levels and for unifying the Arab effort, especially as the enemy not only wants land and natural resources but also seeks to destroy the Palestinian identity and Arab civilization.. The joint struggle calls for consolidating the Arab effort, strengthening Arab military fields and keeping Jordan open to all Arab military forces and potentialities. The Government must, therefore, seek to strengthen the ties of Arab cooperation and to give shining examples in sacrifice with the object of defending Jordan and the whole Arab world. They must make every effort to hold consultations and to participate in drawing up a comprehensive Arab plan, determining roles and imposing obligations. They must implement Arab obligations in letter and spirit and immunise themselves against foreign interference aimed at dissipating efforts.
4. National economy must be used for purposes of the battle, which must dominate policies of development, increase of financial resources and methods of expenditure.. The Government must mobilize all resources for purposes of the battle.. An end must be put to all signs of ill-health in our machines..
5. The Government must not abandon their responsibilities with regard to the application of the Constitution and the laws and regulations in force. By exercising their powers and discharging their duties, the Government will safeguard the legitimate rights of the people and the right of citizens to participate in expressing opinion and in government.. It is, therefore, necessary to encourage organisations and societies, such as cooperatives, chambers of commerce and trade unions, and to exchange views with them regarding the preparation of workplans and the definition of roles. It is also the duty of government machines to serve the people in a speedy, honest and accurate manner, to employ the talented, to combat corruption, to raise morale and to preserve our heritage, civilization and traditions.

Sayid Abdul Munim al Rifai thanked King Hussein for his confidence and presented to His Majesty the names of members of his Cabinet, who agreed to shoulder responsibility in accordance with the contents of the Royal Letter of Assignment.

A Royal Decree was issued yesterday, approving the formation of the new Jordanian Cabinet as follows:

Formation of a new Cabinet (Cont'd)

Sayid Abdul Munem al Rifai	Prime Minister.
Sayid Akif al Fayiz	Minister of State for Prime Minister's Office Affairs.
Sayid Saleh al Mua'sher	Minister of Social Affairs and Labour.
Sayid Abdul Wahhab al Majali	Minister of State for Prime Minister's Office Affairs and Minister of Defence.
Dr Qasim al Rimawi	Minister of the Interior (Municipal and Rural Affairs) and Minister of Agriculture.
Dr. Subhi Amin Amr	Minister of Health and of Reconstruction and Development.
Sayid Anton Atallah	Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Sayid Dhouqan al Hindawi	Minister of Education.
Sheikh Abdul Hamid al Saych	Qadi al Qudat and Minister of Waqfs and of Islamic Affairs and Shrines.
Major General Rashed Araiqa	Minister of Transport.
Sayid Najib Irsheidat	Minister of Communications.
Sayid Fawwaz al Rousan	Minister of Justice.
Dr. Muhammad al Farra	Minister of Culture, Information, Tourism and Antiquities.
Dr. Daoud al Husseini	Minister of National Economy.
Sayid Abdul Qader Tash	Minister of Finance.
Sayid Suleiman al Hadidi	Minister of the Interior.
Sayid Ja'far al Shami	Minister of Public Works.

King Hussein receives
Sayid Qayed Ahmad (Cont'd.)

In a statement after his arrival at Amman airport yesterday, Sayid Qayed Ahmad said that the task of the four-man committee was to discuss and propose positive solutions to problems hindering the progress of the battle waged by the Arab peoples, headed by the Palestinian people, against Zionism and imperialism. He pointed out that the Arab peoples were distressed at the recent bloody clashes in Jordan. He said: "We regret to see Arab blood being shed in our home as the enemy lurks for us. Arab leaders should be on the level of responsibility. They must let logic dominate passion. Public interests must be placed above all considerations. We shall make every effort to preserve unity of the ranks." He affirmed that Palestinian resistance was now an effective and positive element and that it had taken its place in the forefront of Arab movements. He called on the Arab nation to give further support to this resistance and to work for the unity of the Palestine revolution. (Reported in Fatch)

(Fatch)- The Secretariat, representing the Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance Movement, held a meeting with Sayid Qayed Ahmad yesterday)

Kuwaiti aid

Amman: The Government received a payment of D.1,161,000 from the Kuwaiti Government on account of the Kuwaiti aid to Jordan.

Editorials

The Al-Dustour editorial today deals with the recent crisis in Jordan. The paper calls for consolidation of the internal front on firm principles of cohesion and confidence and for courage and sincerity in determining the principles that will guarantee the safety of the people's march along the armed struggle pathway and help in establishing firm cooperation between the Army and the commandos. The paper says that the new Rifai Cabinet shows signs of ability to face the challenge. It welcomes members of the Rifai Cabinet and wishes them success....

The Al-Difaa editorial today advocates the call for national unity.

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86

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
NEJ 114
Mr. [unclear]

PW NEJ 11-
6/7

Mr. Phillips

Jordan Cabinet

f 81
f 82
—

I attach Amman telegram No. 348 and No. 349 about the new Jordanian Cabinet announced on 27 June. I also attach British press comment from the Times, Telegraph and the Express; and a copy of the Jordan leading personalities report for 1969 with more detailed information on 11 of the 17 members of the Cabinet.

2. As Sir Philip Adams says, it is early to comment on the Cabinet. But there are two disturbing signs: in the first place the new Prime Minister, Rifai, is not a strong character and has shilly-shallied in his political course during recent crises; and secondly there is no comment as yet from Arafat and Habash, whose reaction to the new team will be extremely important. Rifai scarcely looks a match for either.

f 83 3. The message from the King to the Prime Minister reported in Amman telegram No. 351 is very much on the right, moderate, lines.

J. P. Tripp
(J. P. Tripp)
Near Eastern Department
1 July, 1970

Many thanks.
J. P. Tripp

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June, 1970

Plenty
am

31)



With the compliments of

CHANCERY

C. P. Carter

Near Eastern Dept., F.C.O.

(Reference our tel. No. 351 of 29 June)

BRITISH EMBASSY

P.O. BOX 87

AMMAN

✓
am

6/7

Cutting dated 19

Husain's martial call to new Cabinet

From PAUL MARTIN

Beirut, June 28

Faced with a need for a reconciliation with the Palestinian guerrillas on the one hand and the latest American peace initiative on the other, King Husain has created a new Cabinet of options. While the new 17-man Government of Mr. Abdul Moneim Rifai includes a predominance of guerrilla sympathizers, including three leaders deported from the west bank by the Israelis, it also keeps open the door to peace.

However, both by his action in increasing the pro-guerrilla content of his Government and in his letter of designation to the new Prime Minister, King Husain gave warning that if the latest peace efforts failed his country might be committed to an irreversible course.

The King said in his letter: "Recent days have made it clear that the implementation of the Security Council resolution has become a mirage because of the obstinacy, pride and greed of the enemy coveting our land, and the support his aggression is getting from forces of evil in the world."

Calling on the Government to mobilize all efforts in the country, he said this would not be possible unless the "military effort and commando action were joined together in a brotherhood of arms pointed at the enemy".

One of the main reasons for the appointment of Mr. Rifai as the new Prime Minister is that he is one of the few east bank leaders who enjoy the trust of the Palestinian guerrillas. This is of the utmost importance in the efforts at rapprochement after the latest and most serious confrontation between the guerrillas and the Army.

However, it must be remembered that Mr. Rifai is Jordan's most respected diplomat and a man who has repeatedly emerged when peace drives, such as the latest one launched by the Americans, have appeared.

The Jordanians have privately made it clear that they are interested in the latest American efforts. However, like all the Arab leadership, King Husain has remained publicly noncommittal, even pessimistic, about the prospects of peace. The main reason is that should he and President Nasser give the blessing to the latest peace initiative and see it fail, the blow to their prestige in the present Arab political climate would be disastrous.

Certainly the most important concession to the guerrillas was the appointment of Mr. Suleiman Hadid as the new Minister of the Interior. Although he is not a Palestinian, he is known to sympathize with the guerrillas and at the height of the latest crisis was one of seven men now in the Cabinet to sign a statement to King Husain supporting some of the guerrillas' demands.

The others are Mr. Akef el Fayed, chief of the Beni Saqr tribe and a strong guerrilla supporter, who becomes Minister of State and number two in the Cabinet list; Mr. Anton Atallah, a Palestinian deported from the west bank by the Israelis, who is Minister for Foreign Affairs; Dr. Kawem Rimawi, who is Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs; Shaikh Abdul Hamid Sayeh, a Palestinian deportee, who is Minister of Religious Affairs; Dr. Dawoud Husseini, another Palestinian deportee, who is Minister of Economy; and Mr. Jaafar Shami, a Palestinian, who is Minister of Public Works.

Among the demands they made were consolidation of relations between the Jordan Army and the guerrillas; formation of a government of national unity; pursuit of a foreign policy aimed at severing relations with the "imperialist states" headed by the United States and strengthening ties with socialist countries; and encouraging the people of the west bank to be steadfast under occupation.

Although five Palestinians from the previous Cabinet were among the 11 Ministers dropped, the new Government maintains the traditional 50-50 balance between Palestinians and Jordanians. Among the other Palestinians are Major-General Bashid Udeqat, Minister of Transport; Dr. Subhi Amin Amr, Minister of Health and Reconstruction; and Dr. Muhammad Farra, who was until recently Jordanian Ambassador to the United Nations.

In spite of the definite swing in the favour of the guerrillas, the key defence portfolio has been given to Mr. Abdul Wahab Majali, a member of the Majali Bedouin tribe and a staunch royalist.

Light action on Israel fronts

From Our Correspondent

Tel Aviv, June 28

Arab guerrillas today harassed Israel's northern and eastern fronts as Syrian regulars remained inactive.

Israeli troops returned fire across the Lebanese frontier after each of three rocket attacks. One Israeli was killed. Also, infiltrators from Lebanon attacked an Israel patrol with bazookas.

Israeli planes crossed the Jordan several times today and bombed an area from which shells had been launched.

Israeli tankmen reported hits on six Egyptian outposts in the southern sector of the Suez Canal.

Jerusalem, June 28.—The Israel Cabinet met in total secrecy today to discuss the United States' latest proposal for a Middle East peace. Attending the meeting were Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, the Israel Ambassador to Washington, and Lieutenant-General Haim Bar-Lev, chief of the armed forces.—A.P.

Cutter

6/5

6/7

ENCLAIR
ROUTINE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 361

UNCLASSIFIED.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
NE J 1/4

TO F.C.O. LONDON
3 JULY 1970.

88

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 361 DATED 3 JULY 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 348: JORDANIAN CABINET CHANGES.

LOCAL PRESS REPORTS THAT MOHAMMED AL FARRA HAS REFUSED APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND THAT HE WILL REMAIN IN NEW YORK FOR THE TIME BEING. NO OTHER APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER HAS YET BEEN ANNOUNCED.

FCO PASS ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].


FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.

&&&&

RESTRICTED

Mr Evans



Mr Evans

Enter on 27

89

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.

25 June, 1970

*P. Garter
7/7*

Dear Christopher,

The Great Compensation Plan Fiasco

*The end one, under
Talhouri.
R. E.*

On 15 June, the Jordan cabinet issued a decree saying that it had decided to set up a fund to compensate the victims of the recent events in the country. To finance this, a "certain percentage" (varying between three and fifteen percent) would be deducted from the June and July salaries of Ministers, Deputies and government and municipal officials. Private firms would be asked to do the same for their employees.

2. There was an immediate public outcry, skillfully led by the newspaper "Fatah" and "Voice of Fatah" radio. As the latter put it, "To ask officials who have limited incomes to pay for the evil-doing of the agent elements and to bear the consequences of this rancorous behaviour against the interests of the homeland and the people while such elements amass money stolen from the people in secret accounts in Swiss banks is flouting the people and supporting and encouraging the agents." Officials in several ministries sent telegrams of protest to the Prime Minister. Those in the Natural Resources Authority said that those responsible for the massacre should pay for it. Government officials in Jordan are not well paid, despite a recent increase in salaries, and in recent months all sections of society have had to face considerable inflation. Protests were not confined to public employees: one of our contacts told us that the employees in his office (East-Bankers among them) had said that they would pay money to Fatah instead of the government. There can be no doubt that the public grievance was general and genuine.

3. On 17 June the government withdrew its decree and said that a committee would be formed to study the payment of compensation from Budgetary sources, since when nothing more has been heard from them. Fatah stepped in at this stage with a message from Yasir Arafat saying that Fatah would consider all "martyrs" who fell in the recent incidents as "martyrs of the Palestine Revolution", and their relatives would receive a monthly allocation accordingly. This order would apply to all civilians without discrimination. It is not quite as comprehensive as the abortive government plan, for it concerns only the relatives of those killed in the fighting, while the cabinet decree concerned loss of property as well.

4. The cabinet clearly misjudged the mood of the people and its inent handling of the affair has done nothing to re-establish its distinctly threadbare prestige among the Jordanian public. It gave Fatah a beatiful propaganda opening, which it exploited skillfully. Altogether a poor omen for the ability of the Jordanian government to seize and keep the initiative.


Yours ever,

C. P. Garter

C. W. Long, Esq.,
N.E.D.,

F.C.O.

c.c. Chanceries at: Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv



CONFIDENTIAL

(90) *JS*
Mr. Lang 6.7
Ente
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6/7

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

2 July, 1970

(1/1)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
7 JUL 1970
NE J114

Dear Peter,

P (82) — On looking again at my telegram No. 349 of 29 June in which I sent comments on the new Jordanian Cabinet, I see that some words were omitted in transmission from the last sentence.

2. I think this should have read:-

"The Resistance Movement can claim to have had some success in securing the replacement of some of those whom they particularly disliked by seven supporters who recently signed an anti-Government manifesto."

Yours ever,

Philip


(Philip Adams)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

c.c. Chanceries,
Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Washington,
UKMIS New York, Tripoli, Baghdad,
Jedda, Kuwait, Paris, Moscow.
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20 3/304/1)

17 June, 1970.

PH.
Adams
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King Hussein's Relations with the fedayeen

NEJ 3/304/1 10

In paragraph 5 of your letter 4/2 of 22 May to Peter Hay, in you gave us your impressions of the American assessment of the situation between the King and the fedayeen together with your comments.

2. You will see from the record of my conversation with Rasul Kilani (which is being sent to you in this bag under a compliments slip) that Rasul believes the King could "clobber the fedayeen" - and indeed may contemplate doing this. One or two people whom I met off the aircraft coming back from Amman on Sunday also seemed to hold this view.

3. It seems to us that the King could indeed have successfully broken up the fedayeen in February, and again last week, had he had the will to do so. On both occasions he seemed almost to have gone half way along this course and then to have stopped. Was this through a failure of will? Or because he could not bear the idea of being responsible for possibly thousands of Jordanian and Palestinian casualties?

4. It would be very interesting to have your reading of the reasons why the King has so far decided not to use his Army, which apparently remains very loyal to him, to destroy the fedayeen before they virtually take over from him.

5. I have put the problem in an over-simplified way: I know that there are many other considerations than those I have mentioned, and many restraints on the King which make a clear-cut decision by him in this matter difficult. On the other hand, time is not working for him and it seems to us that it will only be a matter of months before the King's freedom of action, both internally and as regards a settlement, is much more circumscribed than even today.

6. I should very much welcome your views on this problem.

H.E. Sir Philip Adams, K.C.M.G.,
AMMAN (J.P. Tripp)

~~SECRET AND GUARD~~

An excellent letter, ~~SECRET AND GUARD~~
I think. I suggest that we should send copies (with
copies of your own word paper) to Cairo, Beirut, Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem, London, Paris, Geneva, New York and the UK Deo
NATO. I assume that you would have
(1/1) no objection to me long sending
copies to the Cabinet Office and the
D.I.S. You may wish him to draft
a reply.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

(92)

21 June, 1970

One copy.

R.M. Evans

(94) 4/7.

~~Mr Long 6/6~~ King Hussein's relations with the fedayeen

~~Mr Bovell 6/7~~

~~Mr Mather 6/7~~

~~Enr. Env. 6/7~~

Many thanks for your letter of 17 June. I am
sorry that we have not made it clear in our
reporting over the last year why we believe that
clobbering the fedayeen is silly not on.

2. Perhaps it would be useful to summarise some
of the "anti-clobbering" factors:

~~I agree with
Mr Evans'~~

~~recommendation~~

~~I want to ask
this - problem~~

~~J 15 no 1/6~~

~~6-7.~~

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REGISTRY NO. 10~~

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
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(g) half a million people, one third of the present population on the East Bank, live in Amman; virtually all of them are armed and 80 per cent of them are Palestinians;

(h) my military advisers say that it is obvious guerrilla tactics, should Amman be attacked, for the fedayeen to disperse throughout the whole town. Tanks and armoured cars have their limitations in such a situation: street fighting is normally a job for infantry, and plenty of them;

(i) an army assault on Amman would amount to full scale civil war.

3. The above factors seem to us to add up to a pretty grisly gamble should the King decide to "clobber the fedayeen", and surely for anyone to contemplate such a gamble, the prize would need to be pretty tempting. So long as there is no prospect of an "honourable" settlement one is tempted to ask "freedom to do what?".

Freedom from Re-imbuse? R.E. 47.


4. It follows that I think Rasul's view that the King could have smashed the fedayeen in February or on the last occasion is nonsense, although it is of course held by the small hard-nosed group who surround the King - I had it from Prince Mohammed on 24 June. But furthermore there is little evidence, as seen from here, to support the view that he went half way along this course on either occasion and then stopped. He told me in February that he had not contemplated and could never contemplate using the Army against the refugee camps (i.e. the slums of Amman), and he told me this week that holding the brakes on the Army was the hardest thing he had ever had to do.

5. I am pretty sure that the King's policy towards the fedayeen over the past eighteen months has in fact (given the ups and downs of his moods) been fairly consistent: to encourage the moderate groups headed by Fatah to curb the excesses of the

/extremists

*"Freedom
& action"?*

SECRET AND GUARD




extremists, preferably with the help of the Jordanian security forces, but if necessary with it. Given the considerations in paragraph 2 above, this has always seemed to us the wisest course open to him. Unfortunately what he may have failed to appreciate, and certainly has failed to achieve, is that ~~Patel~~ should trust him, for without that trust ~~Patel~~ must simply regard his attempt to get them to crush the smaller groups as an attempt to divide and rule. Their suspicions of the King's motives were inflamed over the last year by Basul Idbani's unremitting efforts to spread dissension amongst them and to subvert their members, and by the appointment of the hated hard-liner Sherif Nasser to command of the army last summer, which was then followed by the virtual division of the army into two: the Field army deployed against the Israelis and the "White Guard" army of Bedouin troops, comprising the bulk of the armoured forces and the so-called 'Special Force' commandos, under the direct command of the Palace, quite clearly available to deal with the fedayeen. It may be that the King regarded these moves as no more than a sensible precaution against fedayeen bad faith (after all he has as little reason to trust them as they him) but the effect was predictable.

✓ 3. It has, I believe, been common ground between us that the longer a settlement was delayed, the more discredited would moderates like King Hussein become. After all, the King's only hope has always been that his Western friends would bail him out by imposing withdrawal on Israel from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. As it has become progressively more apparent that the West had no intention of doing this, so inevitably has the King's policy of seeking a peaceful settlement become progressively less credible, not only to extremists but to the many moderates in Jordan, and even to himself - and the less credible a peaceful settlement, the less obvious the advantages of clobbering those who oppose one. I

/found

SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD



found the King this week in sombre mood. He told me that he had no intention of using force against the fedayeen unless the extremists pushed him into it, and I think he almost believes that he can only rule now by consent of the resistance movement.

Yours ever.

Philip

(Philip Adams)

CONFIDENTIAL

(93)


RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

3 July, 1970

NEJ 114



Urgent.

R.E. 7/26/7
Re: Trs 18.7/26/7
Re: Log (for copying action).
Re: ~~any~~ ~~any~~ Dear Richard, ~~per~~ (71)
Addm's/7 Encl.

Jordan: King Hussein's Present Position

It is still rather early to judge the extent to which King Hussein's position has been affected by recent events in Jordan. He has, however, had to make a number of concessions to the Fedayeen in an attempt to restore the situation. The following seem to us to be the most significant of these:

a) The sacking of Sherif Nasser and Zeid ibn Shaker.

f (81)
f (82)

b) The formation of a new government, containing ministers in important posts whose support for the Fedayeen is well known. (Our telegrams Nos. 348 and 349), and the dismissal of certain strongly pro-Hashemite ministers, notably Salah Abu Zeid. If the crunch comes, the new cabinet could clearly not be relied upon to stand by the Hashemite regime.

f (83) —

c) The King's letter of assignment to the new cabinet (our telegram No. 351). Three points are particularly significant:-

of/

(i) he described the Security Council resolution as a "mirage", because/Israel's "obduracy, conceit and expansionist aims". This goes closer than before to the Fedayeen position of total rejection of the resolution.

(ii) the King stressed the necessity of providing the armed forces with the required quantities of arms "from any source". While this is not new, it is in the context a sop to those who would like Jordan to move closer to the Soviet Union.

(iii) the King, referring to the economy, said that it must be adapted to the purposes of the battle.

d) The setting up of joint government/Fedayeen committees to control the situation. The committee charged with the investigation of the recent incidents must be particularly distasteful to the King's more hard-line supporters.


e) The Four-Man Committee currently in Amman - a remarkable acceptance of involvement by other Arab states in Jordan's internal affairs.

f) There have been reports that the "Special Branch", an internal intelligence organisation set up by Sherif Nasser, has been disbanded and its leader imprisoned. If true, this represents a significant concession in response to a constantly reiterated Fedayeen demand.

/2. In

R.M. Evans, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL




2. In short, there is now a substantial Palestinian "say" in the way that the country is run, and the King's public posture is now closer to that of the Fedayeen. It is possible that he may thus have increased his ability to control the situation in the short term, but he has not yet achieved the stable understanding with the moderate Palestinian leadership that he will need, in the long run, to ensure the survival of his regime. His popular standing has undoubtedly been enhanced by the various concessions that he has made, and the new government is enjoying something of a honeymoon period. But should differences appear in the cabinet between the radical Palestinians and the more conservative ministers, as seems inevitable, things could rapidly change for the worse.

Yours ever,

Christopher

(C.D. Lush)



Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

94

(NEJ 1/4)

10 July, 1970.

P. C. M.
12/1

King Hussein and the Fedayeen

f (92)

Many thanks for your letter of 26 June. I was grateful for your analysis, and to Christopher Lush for his letter on the same subject to Richard Evans of 3 July.

f (93). —


2. This still leaves open, however, what the King will do if:

- (a) he cannot get on to terms of trust with the moderate groups.
- (b) Arafat moves more towards the extremists.
- (c) as a result of further ground given to the fedayeen the Army see the King is losing out and take the law into their own hands. (The fact that large numbers of fedayeen left Amman when the armoured units moved on the town on 18 June cannot have been lost on the Army.)

3. The prize for dispossessing of the fedayeen or at least ruthlessly cutting them down to size, would I think be "freedom from the incubus" not "the freedom of action" which you tentatively suggested.

4. The alternative to "clobbering the fedayeen" (and I tend to agree with you that the King will shrink from this for the reasons given in your letter) seems likely to be a progressive reduction in the King's authority at home and the silencing of any voice he may have to have abroad. He would presumably remain as a useful puppet of the fedayeen, as long as they want him. Is this an

His Excellency
Sir Philip Adams, K.C.M.G.,
Amman.



acceptable prospect for Hussein? Would he prefer to pull out, leaving to others the thankless task of keeping Jordan afloat?

5. With the prospects for a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute as remote as ever, it may be that the moderate Hashemite regime will be the next domino to go. It seems that there is nothing we might do to prevent this.

(J. P. Tripp)

Copy to: Cairo,
Beirut,
Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem,
Washington,
Moscow,
Paris,
UNHIS New York,
UNDEL NATO.

Reference..... NEJ 1/4

PR	12/7
RECEIVED IN	REGISTRY 11.10
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~~Mr. Evans~~

Drafted. 9.7

King Hussein and the fedayeen

(92)

Fay A

(91)

Fay B

I submit a draft letter from Mr. Tripp to Sir Philip Adams to answer the Amman letter of 26 June as requested. I found it difficult to draft because I have only just seen Mr. Tripp's letter NEJ 3/304/1 of 17 June to which Sir Philip Adams' letter is a reply, and I must say I disagree with it. Mr. Strachan of Amman, when he called on Monday, mentioned the letter and said that the Embassy were surprised at Mr. Tripp's questions in his paragraphs 3 and 4. His line (that the King had only to decide to use force and the fedayeen problem would be solved) is the one which has been championed over the months by the Americans, DI.4, and other departments concerned, but which we have resisted, basing ourselves on Amman's reporting. Sir Philip Adams has now made the case very strongly indeed that King Hussein simply can not, for political reasons, "clawber the fedayeen".

... Long

(C. W. Long)
8 July, 1970.

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95

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY NO. 10

CYPHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO. 380

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

14 JULY 1970.

NE J 1/4

TOP COPY

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 380 DATED 14 JULY 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO MOD D14, HQ BFNE, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AND BAGHDAD.

PC
15/7

JORDAN INTERNAL.

THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME RELAXATION OF TENSION IN AMMAN. JOINT PATROLS ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY AND THERE ARE A FEW FEDAYEEN (SOME ARMED) TO BE SEEN IN THE STREETS. BUSINESS ACTIVITY IS INCREASING AND THERE ARE SIGNS OF A RETURN OF CONFIDENCE.

2. THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THE NAMES OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES ON THE JOINT COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE CARRYING OUT OF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN OF 10 JULY. THESE INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR AND DEFENCE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY. IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE DETAILS OF THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE NEGOTIATED IN THE JOINT COMMITTEE.

3. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY, COLONEL HADDAD, WAS DISMISSED FROM HIS POST EARLIER THIS MONTH. TROUBLE IS HOWEVER, CONTINUING BETWEEN FATAH, WHO CONTROL THE P.L.A. THROUGH THEIR DOMINANT POSITION ON THE P.L.O. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AND THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE P.L.A. ITSELF. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS

/DISPUTE

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- 2 -

2

DISPUTE COULD WEAKEN THE POSITION OF FATAH AND THUS OF THE MODERATE ELEMENT IN THE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO NOD DI4 AND HQBFNE.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCONCEN.

SIR P. ADAMS


[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
N.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

GGGGG:

Ray P/W & *despatched and copies*
of letter under reference
to Chancery Tel Aviv



British Embassy, under

Tel Aviv.

Recd slip

17 July, 1970.

Adams
20/7

(1/5)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
21 JUL 1970
NE J 1/4

Dear Department,

f (12) — We should be grateful if you could send us copies of Sir Philip Adam's letter of 26 June to Peter Tripp and of f (13) — Christopher Lush's letter of 3 July to Richard Evans, both of which are referred to in the first paragraph of Tripp's letter (NEJ 1/1) of 10 July about King Hussein and the Fedayeen.

Chancery
Yours ever,

m.


5/8
(CHANCERY)

Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

Contra

Sent

6/8



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
JERUSALEM.

(1/2)

15 July, 1970.

Dear Department,

(94)

With reference to Mr. Tripp's letter
WEJ 1/4 of the 10 July to Sir Philip Adams,
we have not received the correspondence
referred to in paragraph 1, i.e. Sir Philip
Adams letter of 1 June and Mr. Lush's
letter of 3 July. We shall appreciate
receipt of the above-mentioned
correspondence.

B. Kemp-Dysdale

(Registry)

Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY ROOM
16 JULY 1970
NE J 114.

NE

REG'D

96

(1/1)



Summary of Afghan Despatch of 16 July, 1970

Sir Philip Adams' Valedictory Despatch

Par
13/8

Four years association with Jordan. The problem of Israel not solved by the 1967 war.
(Paras 1 and 2)


The Palestinians - internal dissensions - a modus vivendi with the Government has now been worked out, but will it stick? (Para 3)

Prospects for a settlement dimmer. Time for a change from Dr. Jarring? (Para 4)

The old residence beside the Royal Palaces was given up in 1969. It was out of keeping with the spirit of the times. (Para 5)

The British Relief Fund made a small but useful contribution to the relief of suffering among refugees after the 1967 war. (Para 6)

Tribute to Staff. (Para 7)



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BRITISH EMBASSY,

(1/1)

AMMAN.

16 July, 1970

Sir,

I am due to leave Amman, at the termination of my mission, on the evening of the twenty-first of July, four years and two days since my present association with Jordan began, in an unusual if not a unique manner, by my being presented to His Majesty King Hussein personally by Her Majesty The Queen at Buckingham Palace. During the following ten days of the Jordanian State Visit to Britain my wife and I had the opportunity of getting to know the King, Princess Muna and the members of their suite; and by listening to His Majesty's speeches and informal talks with the British people he met I got in advance of my arrival a good idea of this small country, its considerable achievement in economic and social progress, its aspirations - and its Problem, the alien neighbour state of Israel separated from it by a contested

/250 mile

The Right Honourable

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

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
250 mile long "Armistice Line". The account of my four years' service here is the account of the development of the Problem, to which probably too many reports have already been devoted. I do not propose to recapitulate the story here.

2. It should however be recalled that in the 1967 war Jordan was the greatest loser and in any fresh fighting with Israel she stands to lose more. Yet, tiresomely perhaps for those in the chancelleries of the world, the 1967 war settled nothing. History might have been tidier if the Arabs had suffered a defeat of the order of the German defeats in 1919 and 1945; but they did not, and meanwhile in the Charter of the United Nations the states of the world had forsworn war as an act of policy and accepted the principle of no territorial aggrandisement by its means. What no one has yet found is an acceptable alternative way of settling international disputes, and until it is found I suppose periodical wars are inevitable. Though a loser in 1967 Jordan was not defeated; though her air force was completely destroyed and her army decimated, civilian life on the East Bank

/went

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
went on with little change. The flood of new refugees from the West Bank served mainly to remind the rest of the population of the problem and to strengthen their determination to restore to Arab rule the lands from which, lemming-like, they had come to living death in refugee camps or squalid slums.

3. These refugees are "The Palestinians", some of them the sons or sons of men who fled their country in 1948, but still mindful of the wrongs then done and, herded together in camps and living on UNRWA's dole, increasingly resentful and surly. Small wonder that they have fallen for the bombast and rousing cries of those who offer hope for life of a kind, who preach revolution, who clothe, arm and train them and promise to return them to their former lands. Had they not been Arabs they would surely by now have been made into a unified and determined force of which even the Israelis might have had to take heed. But political argument is the national sport of the Arab, and the Palestinian national movement has from the outset been

/bedevilled

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


bedevilled by dissension and rivalry, by petty squabbles and by serious political differences. This has exposed them to Communist and other ideological influences and has sometimes made it appear that they are more interested in the overthrow of the Hashemite and other "traditional" regimes than in the liberation of Palestine. In recent months a deliberate effort seems to have been made to steer the Palestine national movement back towards the objective of liberation; and once again, following the most tragic and disastrous of the series of clashes between the Government and the fedayeen, a form of modus vivendi has been worked out. My successor will no doubt report in due course whether it has been made to stick.

4. Meanwhile the prospects of a settlement with Israel grow ever dimmer. As seen from here, it appears to be out of the question that the Israelis and Arabs could negotiate such a settlement without outside help; but also that the help afforded by the good Dr. Jarring is no good. If I may proffer a very personal view, it is that not only is "meat on the bones of the resolution" needed, or guidance /required

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required for the Secretary-General's representative, but a change of bowling. If anything comes of the present American initiative and what looks like a Soviet-Egyptian reappraisal I believe it will be important to arrange that the newly found words are spoken with a new voice - this is saying no more than if one bowler, however good, is not taking wickets you try another. A new man may not be easy to find, but if we want peace I am convinced that we must find one. There is also the distinct possibility, so far as Jordan is concerned, that the announcement of the arrival of Dr. Jarring would provoke a reaction of the kind which attended the abortive visit of Mr. Sisco. Despite the totally uncompromising tone of fedayeen statements and King Hussein's correspondingly reduced room for manoeuvre on a settlement I still believe that many Arabs would be relieved if someone could show them the way to peace and that President Nasser and King Hussein would be the first to take it.

5. To turn to non-political matters there are two which, not having rated despatches in their own right, may be recorded here. First the move from the former Embassy house beside the Royal Palaces.


/This

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It is now finally achieved in the spring of 1970. The position of the old and much-loved house, designed by the distinguished architect Austen Harrison and built in the 1920's on land presented to His Majesty's Government by the (then) Amir Abdullah, had made it quite unsuitable as a residence for H.M. Ambassador in the 1970's. As the Royal Palaces and their guards were increased in size and number the presence of a foreign diplomat within their precincts became increasingly embarrassing to the Hashemites; and experience in the war of June 1967 proved what we knew already, that in the event of trouble in town the Ambassador would be cut off from the Chancery and, incidentally, exposed unnecessarily to physical danger. So alternative houses for the Ambassador and Counsellor were found, close to this Chancery, to other Embassies and Government Departments, and the exchange has been made, I think and hope, to everybody's satisfaction. I trust that the new house and garden, on the decoration and organisation of which my wife and I have spent considerable time and energy, will be thought worthy by our

/successors




successors. The upheaval was traumatic, but I have no doubt that it was right to make it. The one lesson we learned was that we ought never to have embarked on an operation of this magnitude without first assuring ourselves of the services of a resident representative of the Ministry of Public Building and Works.

6. Finally, I should record that, immediately after the 1947 war, I was prevailed upon to open a fund into which money for the relief of the suffering of refugees could be paid by British well-wishers. I appointed a small Anglo-Jordanian committee to administer the British Relief Fund for Jordan and before it was closed this spring, for want of funds, we had disbursed a total of some £16,000. Much was given to organisations which were already active in the country such as Save the Children Fund, Y.M.C.A. and a number of Jordanian charities, but which lacked immediate money for specific projects. I hope and believe that this fund brought a measure of relief to many who had had more than their share of suffering and that this comparatively small but essentially human gesture of sympathy and concern was widely appreciated.

/7. And

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7. And so I leave the direction of this Embassy to an experienced and wise successor. To him particularly I commend highly a hard-working staff, not because it is conventional on those occasions to pay such tributes, but because they and I have been through more than the usual number of trials together and because "friendship is made more sacred by adversity". No Ambassador in a tricky spot could have been served more willingly, more cheerfully or more courageously. My wife and I shall miss them all, and their families; and we wish them well.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Philip Adams

(Philip Adams)

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Evans

Mr MacRae by P.W.
Want you of 217-

Sir Philip Adams' Valedictory Despatch

I attach three copies of Sir Philip Adams' excellent valedictory despatch dated 16 July.

2. I recommend that it be printed, without priority treatment and without commonwealth distribution. I have attached the first copy below along these lines.
3. I have attached the usual proforma minute to the second copy for submission to Under-Secretaries.
4. I do not think that this despatch need be sent to Mr. Godber in advance of printing: if you agree, I would propose to circulate the third copy below within the department and to N.A.D.
5. I believe that Sir Philip Adams is coming home before his next posting by car and will not be arriving in London until mid August. With any luck, the despatch may have been printed by then. If not, I will try to make sure it has been read by those he will be meeting next month.

A. C. D. S. MacRae

(A. C. D. S. MacRae)
20 July, 1970

Res P.W.

Please find attached the valedictions
despatch from Amherst with its file.

I agree with the distribution of
have given to this department but
justice that you have only filled
in  one of the forms and not
both of them.

both of them. I therefore am returning this to you with my negative so that you can complete it.

please give send it straight
to Mrs. Wolfe in library and
records Dept. CW 367.

Miss Mansfield

Registry (with key)

Cleaning (or) Dept

Commonwealth Co-Operational

5/8/70.

I have two comments to make on the handling of this
despatch:

a/ It is most unsatisfactory how it
seems apparently over a fortnight ~~ago~~
from Mr. Hipp's signature on a printing form
to the stage when it left Commonwealth
Govt. Northern Dept. If it spent his time
in Commonwealth Govt. Organization Dept., I trust

there will be no repetition.

b/ the file should not in any case have gone to (C.C.), but only in cases of the desperation for printing. I would be grateful if Mr. Moore would name all concerned (including the Dip. ladies).

Fraser MacRae

....
6/8

Mr Macrae, Secy. P.A. 14th Aug 7/8

I must apologise for the delay in the transmission of this ~~desperate~~ diplomatic report. I have only recently joined the Office and since then Martin Hall, who used to deal with these diplomatic reports, has been posted to Singapore.

I have now learnt the full procedure and can assure you that such a delay will not recur.

his Hanfield

CCD 6/8.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 395/70

NEJ 1/4

General Distribution

JORDAN

20 July, 1970

SIR PHILIP ADAMS' VALEDICTORY DESPATCH

*The British Ambassador in Jordan to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(Received 20 July)*

SUMMARY

Four years' association with Jordan. The problem of Israel not solved by the 1967 war. (Paragraphs 1-2.)

The Palestinians—internal dissensions—a *modus vivendi* with the Government has now been worked out, but will it stick? (Paragraph 3.)

Prospects for a settlement dimmer. Time for a change from Dr. Jarring? (Paragraph 4.)

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Tribute to staff. (Paragraph 7.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

Amman,
16 July, 1970.

I am due to leave Amman, at the termination of my mission, on the evening of 21 July, four years and two days since my present association with Jordan began, in an unusual if not a unique manner, by my being presented to His Majesty King Hussein personally by Her Majesty The Queen at Buckingham Palace. During the following 10 days of the Jordanian State Visit to Britain my wife and I had the opportunity of getting to know the King, Princess Muna and the members of their suite; and by listening to His Majesty's speeches and informal talks with the British people he met I got in advance of my arrival a good idea of this small country, its considerable achievement in economic and social progress, its aspirations—and its problem, the alien neighbour State of Israel separated from it by a contested 250-mile-long "Armistice Line". The account of my four years' service here is the account of the development of the problem, to which probably too many reports have already been devoted. I do not propose to recapitulate the story here.

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2. It should however be recalled that in the 1967 war Jordan was the greatest loser and in any fresh fighting with Israel she stands to lose more. Yet, tiresomely perhaps for those in the Chancelleries of the world, the 1967 war settled nothing. History might have been tidier if the Arabs had suffered a defeat of the order of the German defeats in 1918 and 1945; but they did not, and meanwhile in the Charter of the United Nations the States of the world had forsworn war as an act of policy and accepted the principle of no territorial aggrandisement by its means. What no one has yet found is an acceptable alternative way of settling international disputes, and until it is found I suppose periodical wars are inevitable. Though a loser in 1967 Jordan was not defeated; though her air force was completely destroyed and her army decimated, civilian life on the East Bank went on with little change. The flood of new refugees from the West Bank served mainly to remind the rest of the population of the problem and to strengthen their determination to restore to Arab rule the lands from which, lemming-like, they had come to living death in refugee camps or squalid slums.

3. These refugees are "The Palestinians", some of them the sons of sons of men who fled their country in 1948, but still mindful of the wrongs then done and, herded together in camps and living on UNRWA's dole, increasingly resentful and surly. Small wonder that they have fallen for the bombast and rousing cries of those who offer hope for life of a kind, who preach revolution, who clothe, arm and train them and promise to return them to their former lands. Had they not been Arabs they would surely by now have been made into a unified and determined force of which even the Israelis might have had to take heed. But political argument is the national sport of the Arab, and the Palestinian national movement has from the outset been bedevilled by dissension and rivalry, by petty squabbles and by serious political differences. This has exposed them to Communist and other ideological influences and has sometimes made it appear that they are more interested in the overthrow of the Hashemite and other "traditional" régimes than in the liberation of Palestine. In recent months a deliberate effort seems to have been made to steer the Palestine national movement back towards the objective of liberation; and once again, following the most tragic and disastrous of the series of clashes between the Government and the fedayeen, a form of *modus vivendi* has been worked out. My successor will no doubt report in due course whether it has been made to stick.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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I have, etc.,

PHILIP ADAMS.

Too optimistic?
versat.

Mr. Trott.
Mr. MacRae.

99

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BERNUT JULET/70 NO/NO STANDARD

TO TI EXTER 414 IMMED DE PARIS

1318

R.E. 28/

Re Entries & PA. 7

ABSM 287

INFO PARIS CAIRE TAC/4 PRIORITE TI LD/ PRIORITE DE PARIS PRM/4

US/40 CALIFORNIA (DCIS DEPL. AS LOPS) PRIORITE DE OTI OTAN MOSCO

DE LDN

SAC TUNIS TERAN DE OTI

SITUATION EN JORDANIE

ESTI QUE LA VIE SOIT REVENUE A PEU PRES A LA NORMALE A JORDANIE OU JAI

SEJOURNE DU 12 AU 19 LA JORDANIE RESTE PROFONDEMENT TRAUMATISEE

PAR LES DERNIERS EVENEMENTS ET LE SERA SANS DOUTE POUR LONGTEMPS.

DAVRES LES IMPRESSIONS QUE JAI PU ME FORMER A LA SUITE DE MES CONVERSATIONS SUR PLACE SOIT AVEC LE ROI QUI A BIEN VOULU ME RECEVOIR SOIT AVEC LES MINISTRES DES AE ET DE LECO OU AVEC MES COLLEGUES DU CORPS DIPLO ET QUELQUES PERSONNALITES LOCALES, SI LE CALME EST MAIN-

TENANT REVENU IL FARAIT ETRE TRES PRECAIRE ET A LA MERCI DU

MOINDRE INCIDENT. ON COMpte BEAUCOUP SUR LACCORD QUE VIENT DE SIGNER

LE GOVT AVEC TOUS LES GROUPES FEDAYIN POUR ASSURER LE RETOUR DE-

FINITIF DE LA PAIX DANS LE PAYS. RESTE A VOIR SI LES PARTIES EN

CAUSE VOUDRONT LE RESPECTER ET LEXECUTER. POUR LINSTANT IL SEMBLE-

RAIT QUE LES UNS ET LES AUTRES ONT INTERET, NE SERAIT-CE QUE POUR


JOUIR DU REPIR NECESSAIRE POUR PANSER SES BLESSURES, RECUPERER

SES FORCES ET REFAIRE SES PROVISIONS. AU DELA DE CE DELAI ON NE VOIT

GUERE COMMENT ETRE OPTIMISTE, CAR AU DELA DES RETOMBES DE LEXPLO-

SION DE JUN, TOUS LES ELEMENTS DU PROBLEME JORDANIEN DEMEURENT INCH-

ANGES. LA JORDANIE CONTINUE DETERRE LE REFLET EXEMPLAIRE DES CONTRA-



PAGE DEUX A14 CONFIDENTIEL STANDARD

IL FAUT BIEN SOUVENT SE DEMANER SI TOUT LES DERNIERS EVENEMENTS
NE SONT PAS LA CONSÉQUENCE DE LA POLICE. DANS QUATRE TEMPS LES
CHIQUETTES ET LES CHAMPS D'ACTION SONT CE QU'EST BIEN A EXCLURE
TOUT POURRAIT RECOMMENCER EN PIRE DICI QUELQUES MOIS.

LE RÉGIME DE FAIS SAINT AIME LA FAIRE BEAUCOUP MEILLEUR QUON
DOIT. LE ROI PEUT BIEN PLUS BIEN JAMAIS LE CATALYSEUR DE
QUE CE QU'EST UN GRAND CONFLIT ENTRE LES DIFFÉRENTS POUVOIRS QUI SE
only one SE TROUVENT EN PLACE, ET S'ACHÈVENT EN SECTION, DE L'ARMÉE, DES PÂLES-
ET JEUX, DE PLÂTEAU, DE COULEUR, ETC. TOUTES INTERDITES COMME LA
SYRIE, L'IRAQ, L'EGYPTE OU L'ALGERIE OR A L'EXCEPTION DE PETITS

POUR LA CHUTE DE LA MONARCHIE, LE RÉGIME EST BIEN MEILLEUR CONTRÔLÉ PAR
LE ROI TOUT EN SUCCÉDANT A L'ASSASSINAT DU ROI POUR NEUTRALISER LES INTÉ-
RESSES DE L'OPPOSITION. LA FORCE ARMÉE, CANON, LA MARCHE DE L'ANSEURE
DU ROI EST DEVENUE PLUS DURABLE QUE MAIS VU L'IMPORTANCE ACCRUE
DU ROI, JUGÉ PAR TOUS LES SUJETS A L'INTÉRIEUR DU PAYS, MAIS DU MOINS
EST-ELLE TOUJOURS LA PIRE RÉSISTANCE COMME L'ANNÉE DERNIÈRE PLUS QUE JA-
MAIS POUR LE ROI ET SON RÉGIME. LA FORCE EST VRAIMENT PLUS GRANDE QUON
IL FAUT APPRECIER POUR QUE LA DEMI-PEINE CONFRONTATION, ELLE EST
EXTRAORDINAIREMENT BRUTALE. MAIS DE CONSIDÉRABLE IMPORTANCE,
POUVEZ-VOUS VOUS RENDRE COMPTE DE LA PAYS, CONSCIENT DE CET ENSEMBLE DE
DE CONSTATES ET COMPRENDRE BIEN LE RÉGIME QUI LUI EST PRÉSENTIÉMENT
ACQUAISSE, ET PARANT DE VILLE A VILLE A VOLOUT REFORCER SON EMPIRE SUR
LE PAYS EN PROVISAGEANT TOUTE UNE SÉRIE DE MESURES ET DE REFORMES
QUI PERMETTENT D'ASSURER LA UNITÉ DU PAYS ET L'INTEGRATION

PAGE TROIS 414 CONFIDENTIEL STANDARD

PLUS POUSSÉE DES DIVERS ÉLÉMENTS DISPARATES QUI LE COMPOSE. EN CAS D'ÉCHÉC ON PEUT PENSER QU'IL FAURAIT PLUS ALORS D'AUTRE CHOIX QUE DE CONFIER LE GOVT A L'ARMÉE POUR FAIRE REGNER L'ORDRE ET LAUTORITÉ, SI L'INVOQUANT COMME EXCUSE L'INCAPACITÉ DES FORCE POLITIQUES DU DU PAYS MEME DE GAUCHE

4. C'EST PEUT ETRE AUX FEDAYIN QUE LA CRISE AURA ÊTÉ LA PLUS NOCIVE CAR SI ELLE LEUR A PERMIS D'OBTENIR DE LARGES CONCESSIONS DU ROI, ELLE LES A ÉGALEMENT AMENÉS À SOUSCRIRE SOUS LA PRÉSSION DU COMITÉ DES QUATRE PAYS (ALGERIE, ÉGYPTE, Soudan, LIBYE), UN ACCORD LIMITANT DÉSORMAIS LEUR LIBERTÉ D'ACTION ET RENDANT CONDITIONNEL L'APPUI QU'ILS PEUVENT TROUVER À L'EXTÉRIEUR. POUR HUSSEIN ET ARAFAAT CEPENDANT CES DÉVELOPPEMENTS REPRÉSENTENT UN AVANTAGE PUISQU'ILS IMPLIQUENT UN MEILLEUR CONTRÔLE SUR LES PETITS GROUPES EXTREMISTES DE COMMANDOS QUI ONT ÉGALEMENT DU SIGNER L'ACCORD. RESTE À VOIR CE QUE CEUX CI EN FERONT. LEUR COMPORTEMENT FUTUR DEMEURE D'AUTANT PLUS IMPORTANT QUE LEUR PRESTIGE AUPRÈS DES INTELLECTUELS ARABES ET DE LA JEUNESSE EST SORTI RENFORCE DES EVENEMENTS.

5. POUR CE QUI EST DES PAYS ARABES INTÉRESSES AUX AFFAIRES JORDANIENNES COMME LAIRAN, LA SYRIE, L'ÉGYPTE ETC. LA CRISE A PERMIS D'ESTABLIR BIEN CLAIREMENT LE RÔLE ACCRU QU'ILS ÉTAIENT EN MESURE DE JOUER EN JORDANIE. POURTANT, MIS EN PRÉSENCE LES UNS DES AUTRES, ILS PARAÎSSENT N'AVOIR D'AUTRE CHOIX QUE DE SE NEUTRALISER MUTUELLEMENT. A CET ÉGARD HUSSEIN Y TROUVERA SON BÉNÉFICE TOUT EN Étant REDUIT A NE PLUS POUVOIR PRENDRE DE DÉCISIONS SANS TENIR COMPTE DE L'INTERET DE CES PREMIERS.

5. POUR CONCLURE, HUSSEIN AU LENDemain DE LA DERNIÈRE CRISE PARAIT
...2

PAGE QUATRE 414 CONFIDENTIAL STANDARD

DE LA PART DE M. GIGNAC. POUR CELA, J'AI DÉJÀ DÉCRIT TOUTES LES ÉLÉ-
MENTS DE LA CONSENTRATION, ORGANISATION. MAIS SIL CONTINUE D'ÊTRE LE
PÉTROPALATINATEUR, IL NE PEUT PLUS EXERCER QUEN TÉMOI-
GNE DE CE QU'UN DES PRINCIPES AUTRES QUI SE SONT MANIFESTÉS
L'ACCUSATION DE LA CRIME CONTRE LES NEUTRALISANT LES UNS CONTRE
LES AUTRES SOIT EN LES FAISANT VIVRE EN SA FAVEUR. DANS CES CON-
DITIONS, IL COMPREND TOUT LE CONTRAIRE QUI MEME NE POUVOIR ENVISAGER
UN RÉSULTAT POLITIQUE DU RÉGNE COMMUN QUE SI LA CHOSE EST ACCEP-
TEE A FAIRE D'ABORD ET QU'AUTRES PAYS FRÈRES ENSUITE, C'EST À CETTE
CONDITION SEULEMENT QU'IL FAUT DÉSORMAIS AMENER LES FEDAYIN A

LA GUERRE

GIGNAC

CONFIDENTIAL

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REF NOTRETEL 414 JUIL 17

CONVERSATION AVEC HUSSEIN

AU COURS DE LAUDIENCE QUIL MA ACCORDEE PAR 14 JUIL ET SUR LAQUELLE
JE COMPTÉ FAIRE RAPPORT PAR AILLEURS LE ROI HUSSEIN MA CONFIRME
QUIL ESTIMAIT TOUJOURS POSSIBLE UN REGLEMENT POLITIQUE DU CONFLIT
ISRAELO ARABE. IL RECONNAISSAIT QUE CERTAINS INDICES NOUVEAUX DUN
DEBLOCAGE A CE SUJET COMMENCERENT A SE MANIFESTER MAIS IL ETAIT
ENCORE TRES RESERVE LA DESSUS. EN TOUT ETAT DE CAUSE MA-T-IL SOULIGNE
IL FAUDRA ATTENDRE LES RESULTATS DES CONVERSATIONS DE NASSER A
MOSCO AVANT QUIL PUIsse LUI MEME REAGIR AUX DERNIERES PROPOSITIONS
SOUMISES PAR LES AMERICAINS. IL RETAIT PAS EN MESURE ME DISAIT IL DE
DEFINIR UNE LIGNE POLITIQUE A CE SUJET QUI NE TIENDRAIT PAS COMPTE
DE CELLE QUAURAIT PRISE NASSER ET LES AUTRES PAYS ARABES. IL ME LAISSA
ENTENDRE QUIL COMPIERAIT LUI MEME SUR LINFLUENCE DONT DISPOSENT
LES DEUX GRANDS POUR AMENER CES DERNIERS A EMBOITER LE PAS, CE QUI
LUI PERMETTRAIT ALORS DE SUIVRE

GIGNAC

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
29 JUL 1970

NE JIL 4

CYFHER/CAT.A

IMMEDIATE /IRIAI
LNO.401

TO: FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

6 AUGUST, 1970

101

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 401 DATED 6 AUGUST 1970
REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV,
CAIRO, BEIRUT, JISNE, AND MOD DI4.
SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 6 AUG 1970
NEJ1/4

ON 5 AUGUST THERE WAS A CLASH IN THE IRBID AREA BETWEEN DR. SARTAWI'S ACTION ORGANISATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE AND THE P.F.L.P. FIRST REPORTS WERE THAT P.F.L.P. CASUALTIES WERE SIX DEAD AND SARTAWI'S GROUP TOOK SOME PRISONERS. THE P.F.L.P. CLAIMED THAT A NUMBER OF SARTAWI'S MEN TRIED TO DEFECT TO THEM, AND WERE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY FORCE, WHILE THE SARTAWI VERSION OF THE INCIDENT WAS THAT NINE OF THEIR MEN WERE FIRED ON BY P.F.L.P. WHILE ON THEIR WAY DOWN TO THE VALLEY. BOTH SIDES ADMIT THAT ONE MAN FROM EACH GROUP WAS KILLED.

2. IN THE MORNING OF 6 AUGUST A FURTHER CLASH WAS REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN AMMAN (THOUGH WE DID NOT HEAR ANY FIRING) AND AN ULTIMATUM WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY P.F.L.P. TO SARTAWI'S GROUP THAT, UNLESS THEY RELEASED THE PRISONERS BY 1100 HOURS LOCAL TIME, P.F.L.P. WOULD SHOOT AT SARTAWI'S GROUP WHEREVER THEY COULD FIND THEM. NO FIRING HAS YET BEEN HEARD, AND THERE ARE NO REPORTS YET OF ANY INCIDENTS IN AMMAN.

3. THE P.F.L.P. ARE AMONG THE MOST OUTSPOKEN OPPONENTS OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, AND HAVE CRITICISED NASSER FOR ACCEPTING THEM. SARTAWI FOR HIS PART HAS PUBLICLY DEFENDED NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE AND HAS ATTACKED THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO TURN THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AGAINST HIM.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) AND MOD DI4

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCOMCEN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND

CONFIDENTIAL

SAVING TO MOSCOW

PA
from (D)8

CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -

SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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102

By Bag

SAVING TELEGRAM

AN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 7 Saving 4 August 1970

RESTRICTED

Addressed to FCO telegram No.7 Saving of 4 August,

Repeated for information to Washington, Cairo, Tel Aviv, No. 10

UKMIS New York, Paris, Moscow and Beirut.

RECEIVED IN
TELEGRAM, NO. 10
NEJ 1/4.

JORDAN INTERNAL

The Central Committee of the P.L.O. called for a two hour token strike against the U.S. proposals. It was announced that there would be no demonstrations and the strike passed off peacefully. A silent protest march will take place today, culminating in a public meeting which will be addressed by Yasser Arafat.

2. Pamphlets supporting Nasser's acceptance of the U.S. proposals were distributed in Amman yesterday. They were put out by two small fedayeen groups, the Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine, led by Dr. 'Issan Sartawi, and the Arab Palestine Organisation led by Ahmed Zarour. Dr. Sartawi was originally a leading member of Fatah, but broke away to form his own group in 1968. He is a member of the six-man Executive Committee (a sort of inner cabinet) of the Central Committee of the P.L.O., and thus a figure of some consequence in fedayeen politics.

3. Both the fedayeen leadership and the rank and file appear to have been thrown into a state of confusion by Nasser's acceptance of the U.S. proposals, and we have the impression that there is a good deal of uncertainty as to the right line to take.

MR. PHILLIPS

[This Saving telegram dated 4 August, should have been sent telegraphically to the recipients listed on 31 July, but was delayed by error]

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
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ABD... 10/8
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104



10 August 1970

Mr. P. T.

NEJ 1/4

Jordan

~~Mr. Secretary~~ (VB.)

~~Mr. MacRae~~ ~~10/8~~

~~3 the ref. I think a right
letter to
Mo. 8~~

D.A.

12/8

Please refer to recent correspondence between you and Donald Murray about aid to Jordan. I was summoned this morning by Zeili, the Political Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be told that, on instructions from his Government, he had been asked to impress on me the seriousness with which the Iranians regarded the present situation in Jordan and to request that we should do all we could to help the country survive.

2. Zelli hinged his remarks on a recent talk between the Crown Prince of Jordan and the Iranian Ambassador there. The Crown Prince had said that the acceptance of the American cease-fire proposals on the Arab/Israel front had caused very serious internal troubles for King Hussain and his Government. The Iraqis were supporting the Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan, and their troops, without permission from the Jordanians, had recently embarked on manoeuvres on Jordan's northern frontier, no doubt in order to boost the morale of the guerrillas. The guerrillas were plotting against the Jordanian Government and the Iraqis were supporting them. The Crown Prince suspected that the Iraqis were deliberately being provocative in the hope that the Jordanian Government would ask for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Jordan, who would then appear in Arab eyes as wanting to weaken the eastern front against Israel.

3. Zeili ended by saying the Jordanians "have to be helped". I said that while my Government fully shared his Government's anxieties about the situation in Jordan and Iranian admiration for King Hussain's courage and independence, I did not see what we could do to help them in their present predicament. I asked Zelli if he could give me any suggestions of what he had in mind. He looked somewhat embarrassed and said that as we had so many friends in the Middle East he felt sure we could help, but he was incapable of giving me a single practical suggestion. I mentioned that we were already giving some modest economic aid. He agreed with me that any defence guarantee was totally out of the question and would be the kiss of death for King Hussain. I promised Zelli I would report our conversation to you and asked him to let me know as soon as he could what practical help he thought we might give to Jordan.

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.


*Yours ever,
J.P. Tripp*

Copies to: Chancery, Washington

" Amman

" Baghdad

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Near Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

NEJ 1/4

11 August, 1970

P-
13/8

Dear Denis,

Jordan

Thank you for your letter 10/24 of 4 August.

... 2. I attach a copy of a letter I have received today from John Phillips in Amman, giving his impressions of the present situation there. As you will see, he feels that in some ways, the danger lies at the moment not so much with the fedayeen (or the Iraqis, if it comes to that), as from the possibility that the hawks among the King's circle of immediate advisers may try to provoke a further crisis themselves. This seems hardly to square with Zelli's information: and I have the impression that Iranian reporting of Jordanian affairs is extremely patchy at the best of times.

3. I therefore think that you should tell Zelli when you think it appropriate that we of course have King Hussein's position at this extremely delicate time very much in mind: we certainly do not intend to slacken in our support for him in any way. But any particularly obvious gesture by us would probably do him more harm than good. As the Iranians know, we continue to give Jordan valuable economic and technical assistance in addition to a certain amount of modest help in the way of military training. This will certainly continue.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to John Phillips, and to Chanceries in Washington and Baghdad.

Yours ever
P. Tripp
Peter Tripp

(J. P. Tripp)

His Excellency,
Sir D. Wright, K.C.M.G.,
Tehran.


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Mr. McRae 10/8

U.S. EMBASSY, 106

(1/1)



Dear Peter, NEJ 1/4

AMMAN.

Planned. 6 August, 1970

2 with the acc.

108

I have now (on 4 August) presented my credentials and feel that I ought briefly to give you something of the feel of Amman since I took over from Philip Alens just over a fortnight ago. The restrictions on telegraphing have been a blessing to the extent that they have reduced the volume of instant bump to essentials (one hopes that something of this will survive when we return to normal) but they do, of course, involve a delay in reporting and commenting on developments which it is helpful to you to know about, but which do not justify "flash" or "immediate" treatment.

2. The general air is one of guarded optimism and a slow returning to normal. The suq is picking up and the number of local visitors to our downtown commercial office climbing slowly back to pre-June levels. Entertainment, although seasonally at a lowish level anyway, is being resumed. Christopher Lush achieved very good Jordanian attendance, including both East and former West Bankers, at a recent dinner party; and even the German Ambassador has emerged from cover and scored quite a few Jordanians at a dinner party he gave a night or two ago. There are still a number of trigger-happy individuals about, both Hashemite and fedayeen (we have reported separately on the fatal shooting some days ago by one of our Bedu guard at the Chancery door of a man from the Gaza Strip, and on the clash yesterday at Irbid between Habbash's diehards and Sartawi's more moderate group) but in general, except predictably among the more extreme fedayeen, there is an air of cautious hope and relief on all sides, amounting in some Government circles almost to euphoria.

3. It

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

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
3. It is here that I think danger lies. Nasser's actions in accepting the Rogers proposals and clamping down on fedayeen broadcasts have taken heat off King Hussein and strengthened his position as well as leaving the fedayeen in disarray. The King told a member of my staff on 5 August that while he did not altogether share the optimism of some, that the peace initiative really would lead to peace and a settlement, he was now, thanks to Nasser, considerably more confident in his ability to cut the fedayeen down to size if they again got obstreperous. He had, he said, completed, by a process of promotions and appointments to key positions of thoroughly trustworthy elements, his re-dispositions in the Army; he was now dealing likewise with the Armed Police. A striking example of this new policy of the King's is the recent appointment of his cousin, Sherif Zaid bin Shaker, as Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations). Sherif Zaid's dismissal as commander of the 3rd Armoured Division was part of the price paid to the fedayeen for the cessation of fighting in June. This new line is all very well, but now that we have got over the immediate aftermath of Nasser's "sell-out" with minimal violence (and that so far confined to conflict between moderate and extreme fedayeen groups) it does not seem to me likely that Arafat and Sartawi and their like are, if they can help it, going to offer the King a casus belli; the chief danger as I see it is that despite the removal from office of some prominent members of the Hashemite 'Mafia', certain of the King's advisers may in their mood of increased and premature confidence try to create rather than await one. This could set the whole internal situation alight again just when it is cooling down. The signs are that, left to themselves, the split among the fedayeen will widen and the moderate majority prevail. The one way to re-unite them is to attack them.

4. On the whole I am inclined to think that King Hussein will continue to resist the promptings of his own hawks. But I should take it as a bad omen

/indeed

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indeed if his uncle Shaif Nasser came back. An encouraging rumour has it that the latter is interesting himself in the London property market; another that he is dabbling in South African mining shares, but whether it is real estate, reefs, or reefer, I hope very much that he stays away from here.

5. The King also said in the conversation with ~~the~~ member of my staff mentioned above that he was thinking of visiting Cairo fairly soon to try to find out what really happened during Nasser's visit to Moscow. It was clear to him that he had been given only a part of the story by Nasser's envoy last month.

6. For the rest, staff morale remains good and people are going further afield for their recreation, although we are still avoiding parts of Amman itself. Meanwhile, we keep our fingers crossed.

Yours ever,

John.


(J.F.S. Phillips)

c.c. Chanceries

Cairo
Baghdad
Beirut
Tel Aviv
Washington
Jerusalem
Moscow

* see enclosure, which has not been copied elsewhere. (S.)

CONFIDENTIAL



How to play "Cut Kraut"

An unkind game was, until fairly recently, in vogue in Amman.


Any number could play. The only requirements were a telephone and a view of the German Chancery. Play began when the Captain of the challenging team put an anonymous telephone call to the Chancery in office hours to say that a large bomb was about to go off in the building. The receiver was then replaced and the challengers watched. In anything from 15 to 30 seconds flat the ground-floor doors and windows would fly open and the staff emerge at the double with cash boxes and the more valuable files under their arms. They would withdraw to a safe distance and wait. In due course the police, fire brigade, milk boys and other auxiliaries would arrive. Finally, the players would disperse and staff re-enter the building.

There have, so far, been three matches and the score is Challengers 150 points: Germany NIL. The Challengers, being anonymous, have so far not been identified, but suspicion rests on certain occupants (allegedly teen-age girls) of a nearby block of flats.


Method of Scoring in "Cut Kraut"

- a) Staff evacuate Chancery; no bomb goes off: 50 points to Challengers.
- b) Staff do not evacuate Chancery; no bomb goes off: 50 points to Germans.
- c) Staff evacuate Chancery; bomb goes off: a draw, 50 points each.
- d) Staff do not evacuate Chancery; bomb goes off: Challengers are disqualified and their opponents eliminated from further competition.
- e) Staff do not evacuate Chancery; bomb goes off in Challengers' building: Germans are adjudged to have won series.

1087

CONFIDENTIAL

NEJ 1/4



Near Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

12 August, 1970

Dear John,

Many thanks for your despatch on the presentation of your credentials, and for your very interesting letter 1/1 of 6 August.

2. We share your opinion that the present danger may be more from the hawkish members of the King's entourage than from the fedayeen.

3. As to Sherif Nasser's plans, we cannot confirm whether it is reefs or reefs which preoccupy him most at present. I see from Jon Kimche's article in today's 'Evening Standard' that King Hussein is said to have recalled his Uncle. We have not so far been able to confirm this.

Yours ever, Peter

(J. P. Tripp)

His Excellency,
Mr. J. F. S. Phillips, C.M.G.,
Amman.

(entry attached)
Mr. King: trace, 13/8

13/8

CONFIDENTIAL

Cutting dated.....

12 MARCH 1970

REGISTRY

10

108

NEWS

4

Amman faces show-down

By JON KIMCHE

KING HUSSEIN is today mobilising his forces for what may well be the decisive showdown with Palestinian commandos. It has also all the makings of a direct clash with the Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan — now numbering over 15,000 men.

In a cable to his uncle, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Army, Sharif Nasir — who was exiled to London last month following demands from the commandos — King Hussein requested his return to Amman. General Nasir left London last night.

At the same time, the King has formed a Supreme Military Command which is expected to be placed under Sharif Nasir. Its members are the Chief-of-Staff, General Haditha, the King's military adviser, General Ali Abu Nuwar, the reinstated Bedouin chief of the armoured forces, now appointed as deputy Chief-of-Staff, Zaid bin Shakeir, and the new tough head of intelligence, Colonel Nadir Rashid.

Reactivated

The Jordan Army's "Special Forces Units," which were to be disbanded at the request of the guerrillas, have been reactivated and so have the special Bedouin units who were known for their loyalty to the King.

The entire Jordan army has been placed in a state of alert following two developments which have alarmed the King.

The first was a detailed report of the preparation being made by the commandos for a military take-over of Amman and other key towns in Jordan.

Refusal

Colonel Rashid, the new chief of intelligence, had prepared a detailed dossier on this. What had shaken the King in particular was the long list of top floor apartments which the commandos had bought or rented in key positions in Amman, especially in the better part of the city occupied by government and diplomatic personnel.

Sections of the city have been turned into fortified commando positions from which the Palestinians could be displaced only by substantial force.

The second development was the blunt refusal by the Iraqi Government to withdraw its forces from Jordan.

Following the acceptance of the ceasefire by Egypt, Israel

and Jordan, the King renewed his previous request to the Iraqi President, General Bakr, to withdraw his troops from the country as there was no longer any need for them.

General Bakr did not reply to the letter, but sent his Defence Minister, General Tixrithi, to see Hussein. He told the King that the Iraqis would stay until peace was established on terms acceptable to the Palestinians and Iraq.

The King refused to accept this reply and appealed to President Nasser and the Soviet Ambassador in Amman for their assistance in preventing what seemed an inevitable direct clash between Jordanian and Iraqi forces.

This threat has now been still further increased.

The Iraqi Defence Minister has again returned to Jordan but has ignored King Hussein and has established his headquarters with the Iraqi troops at the former RAP base at Mafrqa. He has himself taken command, it seems, of the Iraqis in Jordan.

Reports are now reaching Amman that far from withdrawing, further contingents of Iraqi troops and armour have been arriving in Mafrqa.

At the same time, King Hussein has been told that the Iraqi Government would fully support the Palestinians in their resistance to the American peace plan and in operations in which they might become involved in Jordan.

A last-minute attempt has been made by the Russians to impress on the Iraqi delegation in Moscow not to force the issue. But the indications are that Bagdad has taken the bit between its teeth and is preparing to back the guerrillas in their imminent clash with King Hussein — a clash that may this time decide the fate of the Jordanian monarchy.

(i) Regr pl. enter *14/01*
 (ii) her handbag to see
 (iii) back to me pl. *13/01*

pt *17/01*

*Typical Kimche
 news mongering!*

Refile (i) copy Research Dept.
(ii) Mr. Marguerite Lush 15/8
(iii) Enter ^{Done} ~~for~~ ^{for} copying
(1/1)

CONFIDENTIAL



Exte-

IN
(No. 10)

NEJ 1/4

Dear Peter, Picnic

1970

Wasfi (who was longer to be an reasonable
man with moderate fedayeen) has always been a

with Christopher and Marguerite Lush and I had tea ~~hand~~
near Wasfi and Saadiyah Tel at their beautiful house-
now Chief of Protocol at the Royal Diwan, joined us
a little later.

11 August, 1970

Mr Evans
Mrs Beaufort 18/8/4 178

BRITISH EMBASSY, R.E.

Mr Evans 18/8

ALLIAN.

Mr Martin 0.A.

18/8.

2. It was a relaxed, informal and for us, at least, most enjoyable occasion. A few grains emerged from the chaff, only worth reporting because Wasfi is Wasfi. He thinks King Hussein would have no difficulty in re-imposing his authority with minimal bloodshed whenever he chooses to do so; he admitted that timing was of some - but not now overmuch - importance. The great majority of Palestinians would reject their extremists and settle for a return to (roughly) pre-1967 boundaries on the basis, not that this will produce final peace and a satisfactory settlement but, in some instances, pour mieux sauter next time and, in general, because to hungry men half a loaf now is better than nothing, and certainly to be preferred to a "mensif" in the sky. Wasfi believes that if this much of a settlement is achieved the King will thankfully allow the West Bankers themselves to determine whether they wish to remain in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or to become a republic, or whatever; he rather thought a "federal solution" might emerge. But in Wasfi's view the chances of any lasting peace are thin, not primarily because of fedayeen but of Israeli intransigence. On Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in particular, there could be for the Israelis no compromise.

3. Wasfi is very fit and mentally alert; grooming himself perhaps for what Christopher Lush calls the Cincinnatus role.

Yours ever,

J.F.S.

(J.F.S. Phillips)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1/1)

for copying
action.



Engr.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Mr. Wasfi 18/8/70

AMMAN.

Mr. Martin 18/8/70

11 August, 1970

Wasfi (who was brought from reasonable
views with moderate leaders) has always been
a

Christopher and Marguerite Lush and I had tea with Wasfi and Saadiyah Tel at their beautiful house near Suweilah on Sunday, 9 August. Mireiwid Tel, now Chief of Protocol at the Royal Diwan, joined us a little later.

2. It was a relaxed, informal and for us, at least, most enjoyable occasion. A few grains emerged from the chaff, only worth reporting because Wasfi is Wasfi. He thinks King Hussein would have no difficulty in re-imposing his authority with minimal bloodshed whenever he chooses to do so; he admitted that timing was of some - but not now overmuch - importance. The great majority of Palestinians would reject their extremists and settle for a return to (roughly) pre-1967 boundaries on the basis not that this will produce final peace and a satisfactory settlement but, in some instances, pour mieux sauter next time and, in general, because to hungry men half a loaf now is better than nothing, and certainly to be preferred to a "mensif" in the sky. Wasfi believes that if this much of a settlement is achieved the King will thankfully allow the West Bankers themselves to determine whether they wish to remain in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or to become a republic, or whatever; he rather thought a "federal solution" might emerge. But in Wasfi's view the chances of any lasting peace are thin, not primarily because of fedayeen but of Israeli intransigence. On Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in particular, there could be for the Israelis no compromise.

3. Wasfi is very fit and mentally alert; grooming himself perhaps for what Christopher Lush calls the Cincinnatus role.

Yours ever,

J.P.

(J.F.S. Phillips)



J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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110

(10/24)



British Embassy,
Tehran.

19 August 1970

1/9

PM 27/8

Distr. 27/8

Mr. Long

The Jordanians have
plenty of arms for use against
the fedayeen (or israelis)
Pride and 8

Mr. Peter.

Jordan

When I saw the Acting Foreign Minister this morning I referred to my discussion on 4 August with Zelli and then went on to speak along the lines of paragraph 3 of your letter (NEJ 1/4) of 11 August to me.

105

2. Khalatbari agreed that any open support by us for King Hussein would do more harm than good. He still thought he was in a precarious position, but the only suggestion he could offer as to effective help from us was to consider supplying arms via the Pakistan Military Mission there. I said we already supplied some arms against payment to the Jordanians. I personally had not heard of any request from the Pakistanis or Jordanians for particular arms supplies from the U.K.; I would however pass on Khalatbari's suggestion (which he insisted was a personal one) to you.

24/8.

Yours truly,
J. P. Tripp

P.S. Since dictating the above Khalatbari has telephoned to say that he was thinking of arms to be used not against Israel but against the fedayeen in Jordan. He added that if we were prepared to supply arms for this purpose Iran would be very happy to cooperate with us in providing this assistance.


J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

Copies to: J.F.S. Phillips, Esq., Amman
Chancery, Washington
Chancery, Baghdad

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(111)



Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

(NEJ 1/4)

27 August, 1970.

Mr Markham G. J. H.

Other P. C. in

1/3

Jordan

Thank you for your letter 10/24 of 19 August
about your talk with the Acting Foreign Minister.

2. The answer is of course that the Jordanians have plenty of arms for use against the fedayeen if required, and a great deal of these arms comes from us. They include everything from rifles and ammunition up to armoured personnel vehicles and radio equipment. What we supply to Jordan is limited to a certain extent by the Jordanian ability to pay; but we do not think that there are any serious gaps in their armoury. They also get arms from the United States on credit. We therefore feel that there is not sufficient reason at present for us to consider supplying more arms as Khalatbari has suggested via the Pakistan Military Mission: the method proposed would in itself cause difficulties, and in any case the presence of the Mission may not be permanent; there is already talk of its being withdrawn. We are grateful for Khalatbari's offer of Iranian co-operation but for the same reasons feel that it is not necessary to pursue this at present.

3. If the Iranians really want to help Jordan in her present military, economic and political problems, the best way would be for them to concentrate on political and financial support.

(J. P. Tripp)
Near Eastern Department.

His Excellency
Sir D. Wright, K.C.M.G.,
Tehran.

c.c. J. F. S. Phillips, Esq.,
Amman.

Chancery, Washington,
Chancery, Baghdad.

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EN CLAIR

POLITICAL AFFAIRS
TELEGRAM NO 436

TOP COPY

112.

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
29 AUGUST 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 436 DATED 29/8/70 REPTD FOR INFO
TO CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND BAGHDAD.

PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS:

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10

NEJ 1/4

THE PNC HELD AN OPEN SESSION YESTERDAY EVENING (THE 28TH AUGUST), DURING WHICH THE DECISIONS OF THE CONGRESS WERE ANNOUNCED. THE MAIN POINTS WERE:-

- (A) THAT THE PNC REJECTED 'THE AMERICAN CONSPIRACY KNOWN AS THE ROGERS PLAN'.
- (B) THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE. ANYONE ELSE WHO TRIED TO SPEAK FOR THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE WOULD DESERVE TO BE PUNISHED IN A FIRM AND JUST MANNER.
- (C) THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN NATIONAL WAR AS THE ONLY PATHWAY TO THE ATTAINMENT OF NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS: THEY REJECT THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY INTO A PALESTINIAN MINI-STATE AND A JORDANIAN MINI-STATE.
- (D) THE CONGRESS CALLED FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE POWERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND FOR THE UNIFICATION OF ALL GROUPS OF THE PALESTINE ARMED RESISTANCE, PARTICULARLY THE MILITARY COMMAND WHICH MUST BE ABLE TO CONTROL AND COMMAND THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL ORGANISATIONS IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- (E) THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO PREVENT THE CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BEING HELD WITH THE ENEMY.
- (F) THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SHOULD TAKE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY.

1(G) DMR

- (G) THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT SHOULD ESTABLISH CONNECTIONS WITH ALL ARAB POPULAR MOVEMENTS WHICH REJECT LIQUIDATORY SOLUTIONS.
- (H) THE CONGRESS CALLED ON THE ARAB STATES CONCERNED TO PLACE THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY AT THE DISPOSAL OF AND UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION, SO THAT THE PLO COULD MOVE THE PLA TO SUITABLE POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY IN JORDAN.
- (I) THE CIVILIAN COMMITTEE SHOULD LAUNCH AN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AT AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.
- (J) THE CONGRESS CALLED FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE SERVICES OF VOICE OF PALESTINE RADIO.

MR PHILLIPS

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CHIEF C.I.T./
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 439

TO F.C.O.
31 AUGUST 1970

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10
112

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 439 DATED 31 AUG 70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO D14 JIS(NE) BEIRUT CAIRO TEL ~~NEW~~ 1/4 BAGHDAD WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK, AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

P. am
15

AT 2045 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 AUGUST JUST AS A REPEAT OF KING HUSSEINS TELEVISED SPEECH DELIVERED ON 29 AUGUST HAD FINISHED HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE BROKE OUT IN SEVERAL PARTS OF AMMAN BUT PRIMARILY AROUND GHQ JORDAN ARMED FORCES. DURING THE NEXT TWO HOURS HEAVY FIRING CONTINUED INTERMITTENTLY AND APPEARED TO BE TAKING PLACE ALL OVER AMMAN. FIRING DIED OUT AT 2230 HOURS LOCAL TIME. JORDANIAN GUARDS ON OUR EMBASSY OPENED FIRE AND ARE REPORTED TO HAVE FIRED ABOUT 500 ROUNDS DURING THE NIGHT AT UNKNOWN (AND PROBABLY UNSEEN) TARGETS.

2. THE OFFICIAL JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN STATED AT 10.30 HOURS LOCAL TIME QUOTE AT 2045 HOURS ON 30 AUGUST UNKNOWN PERSONS OPENED FIRE WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS ON GHQ JORDAN ARMED FORCES, THE PUBLIC SECURITY DIRECTORATE AND POLICE DIRECTORATE. GUARDS ON THESE PLACES RETURNED THE FIRE. ONE GUARD AND 2 CIVILIANS WERE WOUNDED. LATER THROUGH THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE FIRING WAS BROUGHT TO AN END UNQUOTE.

3. I CAN AT THIS STAGE ADD LITTLE TO THE ABOVE. CONSIDERING THE LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED THE BAG HAS BEEN MERCIFULLY SMALL. THE SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS ON THREE SEPARATE TARGETS THE MOMENT THE KING'S SPEECH ENDED SUGGEST THAT THE OUTBREAK WAS PLANNED, PRESUMABLY BY ONE OR BOTH EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN GROUPS, AS A DEFIANT ANSWER TO THAT POINT OF THE SPEECH WHICH SAID THAT THE DIGNITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY OF HIS PEOPLE WERE AT STAKE AND THAT ANY FURTHER PROVOCATION WOULD BE RESISTED.

4. AMMAN

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- 2 -

4. AMMAN IS QUIET THIS MORNING AND TRAFFIC MOVING MUCH AS USUAL, BUT THE ATMOSPHERE IS TENSE. POOL SHOPS ARE SHUT AND ARMED FEDAYEEN ARE NUMEROUS. IT IS REPORTED THAT GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES REPORTING FOR WORK ARE BEING SENT HOME. NEITHER ME NOR M.F.A. ARE AWARE OF ANY INCIDENTS AFFECTING BRITISH SUBJECTS.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO DI4 AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCOMCEN WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS

MR. PHILLIPS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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RES. D. (SOV. SEC.)

" (AMER. SEC.)

" (W.E.SEC.)

M.O.D. INT.

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CYPHER CAT/A
PRIORITY ANMAN
TELEGRAM NO 434

RESTRICTED

TO F.C.O. LONDON
28 AUGUST 1970

COPY

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 434 DATED 28 AUGUST 70 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD WASHINGTON AND
NEW YORK.

PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS.

pm
am
11

NET 1/4

THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS MET IN OPEN SESSION YESTERDAY
EVENING, THE START HAVING BEEN DELAYED TO ALLOW YASIR ARAFAT AND
PARTY TO RETURN FROM CAIRO. THE VENUE WAS CHANGED AT THE LAST
MOMENT FROM WAHDAT REFUGEE CAMP TO THE HALL OF THE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION IN ANMAN.

2. BETWEEN 600 AND 700 PEOPLE ATTENDED THE SESSION INCLUDING
THE 115 MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS ITSELF, (THE COMPOSITION OF WHICH
APPEARS TO BE VIRTUALLY THE SAME AS FOR THE CAIRO MEETING IN
EARLY JUNE) ARAB DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS, AND A NUMBER OF SUPPORTING
DELEGATIONS FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND "LIBERATION MOVEMENTS".
ABSENT HOWEVER WERE DELEGATES FROM CHINA, ALBANIA, NORTH
KOREA AND THE BLACK PANTHERS ALSO GEORGE HABBASH OF PFLP, WHO
WAS REPRESENTED BY HIS DEPUTY HAWATMEH OF PDFLP WAS REPORTEDLY
PRESENT.

3. SPEECHES WERE MADE BY YAHYA HAMOUDAH,
(PRESIDENT OF THE PNC), YASIR AMR (PRESENTING THE REPORT OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE), AND DELEGATES FROM SYRIA, IRAQ, THE ARAB
SOCIALIST UNION OF THE U.A.R., LEBANON, THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION
OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB GULF, AND BY SULEIMAN AL NABULSI OF THE JORDAN-
IAN NATIONAL GROUPING. ALL OF THESE WERE ON STANDARD AND
PREDICTABLE LINES. OBSERVERS REPORT THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY
MILD IN TONE AND THAT NONE EVOKED MUCH ENTHUSIASM ON THE PART
OF THE AUDIENCE, ALTHOUGH THE UAR DELEGATE (WHO WAS OBVIOUSLY
VERY NERVOUS) RECEIVED MORE THAN THE OTHERS. THE CONGRESS THEN
WENT INTO CLOSED SESSION, AT WHICH IT IS REPORTED THAT YASIR
ARAFAT MADE A RELATIVELY MILD SPEECH.

1/4. THERE

RESTRICTED

4. (CONT'D)

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4. THERE WILL BE FURTHER CLOSED SESSIONS TODAY FOLLOWED BY A SHORT OPEN SESSION THIS EVENING AT WHICH RESOLUTIONS WILL BE ANNOUNCED.

FCO PASS ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CIPHER CAT A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 443

TO F.C.O.

TOP COPY

1 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY NO. 10

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 443 DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO PRIORITY D14 JIS(NE) AND ROUTINE TO BEIRUT
CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND
MOSCOW AND PARIS.

NY TELEGRAM NO 439.

113

SAVING TO
NEJ 1/4

pr
an
2/9

MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC AND PEOPLE APPEARS TO BE BACK TO NORMAL
IN AMMAN THIS MORNING BUT THE ATMOSPHERE IS STILL VERY TENSE.
REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING THAT THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT(PARAGRAPH 2
OF MY TELEGRAM) IS THE REVERSE OF THE TRUTH AND THAT THE ARMY
THEMSELVES STARTED THE FIRING.
THIS IS AN OBVIOUS LINE FOR THE FEDAYEEN TO TAKE, AND WE HAVE NO
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.

2. THE EMBASSY BUILDING SUFFERED ONE HIT FROM A POINT FIVE INCH
ARMOUR PIERCING BULLET WHICH PENETRATED THE OUTSIDE WALL OF THE
INCINERATOR ROOM AT THE TOP STOREY AND LODGED IN THE ONE OPPOSITE.

I AM ASKING THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONFINE THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR
EMBASSY GUARDS (WHOSE FIRING OF FIVE HUNDRED ROUNDS ON SUNDAY NIGHT
HAS DRAWN COMMENT FROM THE FEDAYEEN PRESS) TO DEFENCE AGAINST
DIRECT ATTACK ONLY. AT PRESENT THEY ARE ALL TOO READY TO JOIN IN
ANY SHERMOZZLE THAT OFFERS.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO D14 AND JIS(NE).

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN AND ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW
YORK AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. PHILLIPS.

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FLASH ALARM TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICES
TEL. NO. 445

2 SEPTEMBER 1970

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2/9

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 445 DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND IMMEDIATE
TO CAIRO BEIRUT PARIS TEL AVIV DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPT ON KING HUSSEIN'S LIFE YESTERDAY EVENING
(ABOUT WHICH I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY) ZAID RIFAI TELEPHONED
TO SAY THAT ON THE KING'S RETURN FROM THE AIRPORT HE FOUND AN
IRAQI "ULTIMATUM" DEMANDING THAT THE JORDAN ARMY STOP FIRING AT
THE FEDAYEEN OTHERWISE THE IRAQI EASTERN COMMAND WOULD HAVE TO
TAKE ACTION. THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT, SAID RIFAI, HAD ALREADY
INFORMALLY REJECTED THE ACCUSATION AND RETORTED THAT THEY HELD
THE IRAQIS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION,
THAT THEY WERE INFORMING ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF THE IRAQI THREATS,
AND THAT IF IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN INTERFERED IN ANY WAY, THE
JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD "HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTION TO TAKE".
THE PRIME MINISTER HAS IN FACT SINCE INFORMED THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR
THAT A FORMAL REPLY TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S NOTE WILL BE SENT IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE CABINET MEETING WHICH IS DUE TO BE HELD AT 0900 LOCAL TIME
TODAY.

2. ZAID RIFAI WENT ON TO ASK THAT H.M.G., THE AMERICANS AND THE
FRENCH SHOULD IF POSSIBLE CONCERT WITH THE RUSSIANS A JOINT
STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE JORDANIAN POSITION AND CONDEMNING IRAQI
INTERVENTION. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INSISTENT THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD
BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS GESTURE.
MY AMERICAN AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR REQUEST.
ACCORDING TO THE LATTER THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR, WHOM HE
TELEPHONED, HAS NOT.

3. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS ALREADY CONVEYED ZAID RIFAI'S REQUEST
TO HIS GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE REPLIED THAT WHILE THEY DO NOT WISH
TO GET INVOLVED THEY ARE INSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN
MOSCOW TO ASK THE RUSSIANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO COOL DOWN
THE IRAQIS. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS NOT SO FAR REPORTED BUT IS
DOING SO TODAY.

/4. RIFAI,

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-2-

4. RIFAI, TO WHOM I SPOKE AGAIN THIS MORNING, IS TODAY MORE RELAXED AND REPORTS THAT THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT BY IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN IS UNSCATHED.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND DEFCONCEN
MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED. SENT TO D.C.C.]

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IMMEDIATE AIRMAIL TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 446

2 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 446 DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW BAGHDAD CAIRO BEIRUT PARIS AND TEL AVIV.

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pm
219

JORDAN INTERNAL.

NEJ 1/4

AT 5.30 P.M. (LOCAL TIME) YESTERDAY THE CONVOY IN WHICH KING HUSSEIN WAS TRAVELLING WAS AMBUSHED NEAR THE AIRPORT BY ARMED MEN BELIEVED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE P.D.F.L.P.

THE KINGS ESCORT, WHO HAD BEEN FORWARDED THAT SOME SUCH INCIDENT WAS LIKELY, DEALT WITH THE ATTACKERS SUCCESSFULLY, AND THE KING ESCAPED UNSCATHED.

HOWEVER EXCHANGES OF FIRE SPREAD TO ALL AREAS OF THE TOWN AND MORTARS AND ANTI-TANK ROCKETS WERE USED. MOST OF THE SHOOTING DIED AWAY BY ABOUT 8.30 P.M. BUT INTERMITTENT SMALL ARMS FIRING CONTINUED UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT. THERE HAS BEEN SOME FURTHER SMALL ARMS FIRING IN THE CENTRE OF THE TOWN THIS MORNING.

SO FAR THERE HAVE BEEN COMPARATIVELY FEW CASUALTIES REPORTED (NONE BRITISH) BUT A NUMBER OF BUILDINGS INCLUDING HOSPITALS AND ONCE AGAIN THE MAIN HOTEL HAVE BEEN DAMAGED.

2. ONE MORTAR BOMB LANDED ON THE RUNWAY OF AMMAN AIRPORT, WHICH WAS CLOSED TO TRAFFIC. IT IS HOPED THE DAMAGE WILL BE REPAIRED AND THE AIRPORT REOPENED VERY SOON.

3. NEARLY ALL SHOPS AND OFFICES IN THE CENTRE OF TOWN ARE CLOSED, AND THERE IS LITTLE TRAFFIC. THE FEDAYEEN HAVE SET UP ROAD BLOCKS ON SOME STREETS. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ARE MEETING THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS MEANS OF BRINGING THE SITUATION BACK UNDER CONTROL

/4. WE ARE

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-2-

4. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH COMMUNITY AND HAVE ADVISED THEM TO STAY CLOSE TO THEIR HOMES UNTIL THE SITUATION BECOMES CLEARER.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PARIS

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO FOR 020945Z

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (U.K)

SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO MODUK ARMY TELEGRAM NO FCH 020945Z SEP 70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO DA BEIRUT DA CAIRO DA BAGHDAD DA TEL AVIV JIS(NE) JIS GULF AND FCO.

FROM DA AMMAN.

*Per
3/9*

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NEJ 1/4

EMI JORDAN ARMED FORCES WAS SEEN BY DA AT 020645Z
 EMI STATED THAT KING HUSSEIN'S CONVOY WAS AMBUSHED AT ABOUT 011530Z
 ON THE WAY FROM AMMAN TO THE AIRPORT IN THE AREA OF A LEVEL CROSSING
 OVERLOOKED BY A STEEP HILL ON WHICH ARE MANY HOUSES, SOME HALF MILE
 FROM THE AIRPORT. THE ATTACKERS, HE SAID, WERE THOUGHT TO BE MEMBERS
 OF P.D.F.L.P. SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS FIRST HEARD ON JEBEL AMMAN AT
 ABOUT 011600Z AND SEEMED TO SPREAD QUICKLY TO ALL AREAS OF THE TOWN.
 FIRING WAS HEAVY UNTIL ABOUT 1830Z AND INCLUDED M42 AND PROBABLY
 SALADIN ARMAMENT AS WELL AS THE USUAL FEDAYEEN RPG TYPE WEAPON.
 FIRING THEN DIED DOWN WITH ONLY INTERMITTENT SMALL ARMS FIRE
 CONTINUING UNTIL JUST AFTER MIDNIGHT. EMI STATED THAT DURING 01
 SEP INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED AT CHQ THAT SOME INCIDENT WAS SOON TO
 OCCUR. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO YASER ARAFAT AND THUS
 THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN ON THE ALERT. HE SAID THAT MORTAR
 BOMBS HAD LANDED IN THE GHQ BUILDING COMPLEX (DA SAW ACTUAL
 EVIDENCE OF THIS). SECURITY FORCES HAD ONLY FIRED AT KNOWN FEDAYEEN
 BASES AND NOT INTO ANY REFUGEE CAMPS. HE SAID THAT FEDAYEEN BASES
 NEAR THE AIRPORT AND ON THE JEBEL IN SOUTH EAST AMMAN ONLY HAD
 BEEN FIRED ON BY SECURITY FORCES IN RETALIATION TO FEDAYEEN FIRE.
 ONE MORTAR SHELL HAD LANDED ON A RUNWAY AT AMMAN AIRPORT BUT IT
 WAS HOPED THAT THE AIRPORT WOULD BE OPENED VERY SOON (HE TELEPHONED
 IN DA'S PRESENCE TO THE AIRPORT TO FIND OUT ABOUT THIS). AFTER
 A CABINET MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 020700Z A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE
 CENTRAL COMMITTEE WOULD BE TAKING PLACE. HE AGREED THAT NO ACTION
 WAS BEING TAKEN TO WORSEN THE PRESENT THING SITUATION.

2. IRAQIS.

DMI SAID THAT THE IRAQI SIX ARMoured BRIGADE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM SYRIA TO JORDAN SOME FOURTEEN DAYS AGO FOR TRAINING.
 IT HAD BEEN REPLACED BY THE IRAQI TWELVE ARMoured BRIGADE.

/IRAQI FORCES

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SECRET//NOFORN

- 2 -

IRAQI FORCES HAD BEEN NOTICED RECENTLY AS BEING ON THE ALERT. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT IRAN COULD BE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN KEPT TOPPED UP WITH PETROL.

IN ANSWER TO A DIRECT QUESTION HE SAID THAT THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF ANY UNUSUAL IRAQI MILITARY ACTIVITY IN OR NEAR AMMAN. HE SAID THAT ANY NECESSARY JORDANIAN PRECAUTIONS TO WATCH THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN AND DID NOT SEEM WORRIED THAT ANY IRAQI ACTION WAS IMMINENT.

3. SITUATION AS AT 020800Z.

SHOPS IN THE SUQ ARE CLOSED AND LITTLE TRAFFIC IS MOVING. THERE HAS BEEN ONE REPORT OF FIRING IN THE AREA OF THE PHILADELPHIA HOTEL. FEDAYEEN HAVE BLOCKED SOME ROADS NEAR THE BRITISH COUNCIL BUILDING AND ESTABLISHED OTHER CHECKPOINTS ON THE AMMAN/ZERQA ROAD. ENI STATED THAT A ROAD BLOCK HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY FEDAYEEN OPPOSITE THE MARQA REFUGEE CAMP.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2549

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND CO^{MMONWEALTH} OFFICE
2 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN

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119

CONFIDENTIAL

NEJ 1/4

319

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2549
OF 2 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN MOSCOW CAIRO
BAGHDAD BEIRUT PARIS TEL AVIV JIS(NE) JUS(CULF).

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 248 TO AMMAN: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH SEELEY, THE COUNTRY
DIRECTOR CONCERNED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

2. SEELEY EXPLAINED THAT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS BEFORE THE JORDANIANS
REQUESTED A FOUR-POWER STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE JORDANIAN POSITION
AND CONDEMNING IRAQI INTERVENTION THEY HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE
AMERICANS THE POSSIBILITY OF A BILATERAL US/SOVIET STATEMENT TO
THE SAME EFFECT. ON THE BASIS OF THIS EARLIER APPROACH THE STATE
DEPARTMENT HAD CONSIDERED THE MATTER BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE
MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION WHICH THE US COULD TAKE WOULD BE TO MAKE
A PRIVATE APPROACH TO BOTH THE UAR AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS AS THEY
ALONE COULD BE EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY LEVERAGE WITH THE IRAQIS.

THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BERGUS IN CAIRO WERE TO ASK THE EGYPTIANS TO
DO WHAT THEY COULD TO CALM THE SITUATION WHEREAS THOSE TO AMBASSADOR
BEAN IN MOSCOW WERE TO REQUEST THE RUSSIANS MORE SPECIFICALLY TO USE
WHAT INFLUENCE THEY HAD IN BAGHDAD TO RESTRAIN THE IRAQIS.

3. IN BOTH INSTANCES THE REACTIONS TO THE US APPROACHES WERE
SYMPATHETIC. IN MOSCOW MR VINOGRADOV, WHO WAS AMBASSADOR BEAN'S
INTERLOCUTOR, TOOK THE LINE THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN AMMAN
HAD NOT REPORTED ANYTHING ABOUT UNTOWARD IRAQI ACTIONS. THE
AMERICANS HAVE ALSO HEARD FROM AMMAN THAT THE SOVIET CHARGE THERE
DENIED HAVING BEEN APPROACHED BY THE JORDANIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN
ANY TWO OR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE
CONSIDERING WHETHER TO SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR EMBASSY IN AMMAN
TO URGE THE JORDANIANS TO MAKE THEIR REQUEST CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS.
THEY WERE INCLINED TO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IN MAKING THEIR APPROACH
IN CAIRO AND MOSCOW THEY HAD ALREADY DONE ALL THAT THEY EFFECTIVELY

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2.

COULD DO BETTER THE JORDANIANS IN THIS SITUATION. SEELEYE SAID THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE NOW CLAIMING THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BACKED DOWN SOMEWHAT FROM THEIR QUITE ULTIMATUM UNQUOTE BUT ADDED THAT RIFAI WAS INCENSED BY THE IRAQIS NOW CLAIMING THAT THE CEASEFIRE IN AMMAN HAD RESULTED FROM THEIR ULTIMATUM.

4. SEELEYE ASKED WHAT OUR ATTITUDE WAS TOWARDS THE JORDANIAN APPEAL TO THE FOUR POWERS. WE EXPLAINED THIS ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAPH UNDER REFERENCE. SEELEYE AGREED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF JOINT FOUR POWER ACTION ON THE LINES WHICH THE JORDANIANS WANTED.

5. DISCUSSING WHAT IRAQI INTENTIONS MIGHT BE, SEELEYE AGREED THAT THEIR QUOTE ULTIMATUM UNQUOTE WAS IN THE MAIN A PART OF THEIR WAR OF NERVES ON BEHALF OF THE FEDAYEEN- HE THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT IT REFLECTED ANY REAL INTENTION ON THE PART OF THE IRAQIS TO MAKE ANY FORWARD MILITARY MOVE WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE IRAQI FORCES IN CLASHES WITH THE JORDANIAN ARMY.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN MOSCOW CAIRO BAGHDAD BEIRUT PARIS
TEL AVIV JIS(NE) JIS(GULF).

MR. FREEMAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 448

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
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1973

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 448 DATED 3/2/73 4 REPEATED INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON JERUSALEM AND BAGHDAD.

YOUR TEL NO 249 (NOT TO ALL): SITUATION IN JORDAN.

I AGREE WITH THE ADVICE YOU ARE GIVING.



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FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM...

MR PHILLIPS..

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 248

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TO AMMAN
2 SEPTEMBER 1970
(NE)

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ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 248 OF 2 SEPTEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, BEIRUT,
PARIS, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE), JIS (GULF)

YOUR TELNO 445: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

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WE SEE NO PROSPECT AT ALL OF THE FOUR POWERS BEING READY
TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT OF THE KIND WHICH ZAID RIFAI APPEARS
TO HAVE IN MIND.

2. WE ARE GLAD THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE INSTRUCTED THE
US AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO ASK THE RUSSIANS TO EXERCISE A
MODERATING INFLUENCE OVER THE IRAQIS. WE DOUBT WHETHER PARALLEL
ACTION BY OURSELVES WOULD ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE FORCE OF THESE
AMERICAN REPRESENTATIONS. IF, HOWEVER, YOU JUDGE THAT IT WOULD BE
USEFUL IN TERMS OF OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS
GOVERNMENT FOR HM AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO SPEAK TO THE RUSSIANS,
WE WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO INSTRUCT HIM ACCORDINGLY.

3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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CYPHER CAT.A.

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 249

TO AMMAN

2 SEPTEMBER 1970 (N.E.)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 249 OF 2 SEPTEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, JERUSALEM.

SITUATION IN JORDAN.

WE ARE RECEIVING ENQUIRIES FROM TRAVELLERS INTENDING TO
VISIT JORDAN. FOR THE MOMENT, WE ARE RECOMMENDING THOSE TRAVELLERS
WHOSE BUSINESS IS LESS URGENT TO POSTPONE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM DAY
TO DAY UNTIL THE SITUATION BECOMES CLEARER., BUT WE ARE NOT AS YET
RECOMMENDING THOSE WITH URGENT BUSINESS TO DELAY THEIR JOURNEYS.
GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF YOU WOULD WISH US TO MODIFY THIS ADVICE IN
ANY WAY.

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315

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 3 SEP 1970
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~3 September, 1970pt
X/9~~JORDAN~~Events in Jordan

Clashes between Palestinian commando groups and elements of the Jordan army took place in Amman on 26, 28 and 29 August. On 30 August an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate King Hussain in Amman. There followed several hours of heavy fighting in the town. Fighting flared up again on 1 September. But some kind of cease-fire, which seems to have held reasonably well, came into effect at the end of that day.

International Action

2. The Iraqis have behaved thoroughly mischievously. On 1 September, the Iraqi Ambassador in Amman conveyed a message to King Hussain which demanded an immediate end to action by the Jordan army against the Palestinian commandos and threatened intervention by Iraqi forces in Jordan if this demand was not met. A similar message was conveyed to the Jordan Ambassador in Baghdad. The terms of this latter message were subsequently broadcast by Baghdad radio.

3. The Jordan Government re-acted by asking the Ambassadors of the Four Powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France) in Amman whether their Governments

/would

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would agree to issue a joint statement supporting the Jordan Government and condemning the action of the Iraqis. The State Department decided that it would be pointless to work for a statement of this kind. Instead, they instructed the United States' Ambassador in Moscow and the Head of the United States' Interest Section in Cairo to invite the Russians and the Egyptians to use what influence they had in Baghdad to restrain the Iraqis. Action has been taken on these instructions. According to the State Department the reactions in both Moscow and Cairo were sympathetic.

4. We have asked H.M. Ambassador in Amman whether he thinks that an approach to the Russians by H.M. Ambassador in Moscow would be helpful in terms of British relations with King Hussain and his Government. We await his reply.

British Lives and Property

5. H.M. Ambassador in Amman reported on 2 September that no British subjects had been killed or injured in the fighting. He said that some slight damage had been done to the Embassy building by a shell.

Causes of the Trouble

6. The basic cause of the renewed outbreak of violence is the unstable political situation which exists in Jordan. The immediate cause was probably frustration among many of the Palestinian commandos caused by the acceptance by President Nasser and King Hussain of the United States' proposals of 19 June. We shall probably never know who fired first.

Outlook

7. The situation in Amman seems rather better than it was

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48 hours ago. We can only hope it will continue to improve. We believe that the irresponsible behaviour of the Iraqis has largely been a matter of bravado. Yet there is a risk that Iraqi troops might become involved in fighting. The outlook is not encouraging; in the absence of a political settlement, the situation in Jordan will remain volatile and unstable.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 September, 1970

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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 449

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 449 DATED 2/9/70 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW BAGHDAD CAIRO BEIRUT
PARIS TEL AVIV JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 248: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

121
FROM MY POINT OF VIEW IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HELP OUR
RELATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS GOVERNMENT IF WE WERE
SEEN TO BE MAKING SOME RESPONSE (WHATEVER ITS LIKELY
EFFECTIVENESS) TO AN APPEAL ON THE MORROW OF AN ATTEMPT
ON HIS LIFE. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD
CONSIDER INSTRUCTING H.M. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ACCORDINGLY.

RECEIVED IN
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FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND DEFCONCEN
DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS (NE) AND JIS GULF.

MR PHILLIPS [REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [SENT TO D.C.C.]

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 451

3 SEPTEMBER 1970

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
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ADPRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 451 DATED 3 SEPT 1970 RELATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO DEFCOMCEN WASHINGTON BAGHDAD CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK JIS GULF AND JIS(NE).

MY TELEGRAM NO 449:

JORDAN AND IRAQ.

124



THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK TO RAISE THE JORDANIAN REQUEST WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR POWERS THIS MORNING. THE FRENCH INTEND TO PROPOSE THAT THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT DIRECTED AT THE IRAQIS DEPLORING ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN JORDAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY ARGUE THAT THIS IS THE BUSINESS OF THE FOUR POWERS BECAUSE IRAQI ACTIONS COULD GIVE ISRAEL AN EXCUSE TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS WITH JORDAN.

2. THE FRENCH HAVE ALSO INSTRUCTED THEIR AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD TO MAKE A DEMARCHE ON SIMILAR LINES. THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE THAT HE HAS AFTER ALL RECEIVED A SIMILAR REQUEST TO THE ONE ADDRESSED TO THE OTHER THREE POWERS, BUT DO NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION THE RUSSIANS PROPOSE TO TAKE ON IT.

3. AS SEEN FROM HERE, WHILE THE MOST PROMISING WAY OF INFLUENCING THE IRAQIS WOULD BE A SOVIET APPROACH, A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THE KIND ENVI SAGED BY THE FRENCH WOULD BE A USEFUL MEANS OF EXPRESSING FOUR POWER SUPPORT FOR THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE MOST WELCOME TO THEM. IF THE RUSSIANS AGREED I SHOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD SUPPORT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL.
DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS GULF AND JIS(NE).

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND DEFCOMCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

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IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 942

3 SEPTEMBER 1970 1000

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ADDS TO FCO TELEGRAM NO.942 DATED 3/9/70 REPEATED FOR INFO (IMMEDIATE) TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD AND (ROUTINE) TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BEIRUT, PARIS AND JISNE.

EVENTS IN JORDAN

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THE UAR PRESS HAS SO FAR STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED TAKING SIDES BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE PALESTINIANS. TODAY'S EDITORIAL IN AHRAM CALLS FOR NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO ALLOCATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECENT EVENTS.

2. TODAY'S AHRAM REPORTS THAT THE UAR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS INFORMED THE ARAB LEAGUE THAT THEY SUPPORT THE PLO PROPOSAL FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE LEAGUE COUNCIL WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE HELD ON 5 SEPTEMBER. NO INDICATION IS GIVEN OF THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE MEETING IS TO BE HELD, BUT TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS SEPARATELY THAT MAHMUD RIAD LEAVES FOR LUSAKA ON 4 SEPTEMBER.

3. AHRAM ALSO REPORTS THAT THE UAR HAS PROPOSED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CESSATION OF
 (I) ARMED CLASHES,
 (II) PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS, AND
 (III) ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS POLITICALLY BY ANY PARTY. THE LAST POINT IS THE NEAREST THE PRESS COMES TODAY TO CRITICISING IRAQI INTERVENTION ALTHOUGH FULL PRESS COVERAGE IS GIVEN TO AGENCY REPORTS OF THE IRAQI NOTE, AND GENERALISED ATTACKS AGAINST PRESIDENT BAKR CONTINUE TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

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REGISTRY NO. 10
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EN CLAIR
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 452

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 452 DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV JIS(NE) MOD D14
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW.

MY TWO I.F.TELS CONTAIN THE TEXTS OF, RESPECTIVELY, THE
NOTE DELIVERED BY THE IRAQIS TO THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT ON THE EVENING
OF 1 SEPTEMBER AND OF THE JORDANIAN REPLY OF 2 SEPTEMBER.

DEFCONCEN PSS ROUTINE TO JIS(NE) AND D14.

FCO PASS ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN CLAIR
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 453

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM NO 453 DATED 3 SEPT 70 REPEATED FOR INFO
TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV JIS(NE) MOD DI4
WASHINGTON UKMIS N.Y. AND MOSCOW.

THE IRAQI NOTE READS AS FOLLOWS:-

REF ID: A128

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"THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HOPE THAT THE JORDANIAN FORCES WILL
STOP FIRING ON THE FEDAYEEN. IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE TO DO SO
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PREVENT INDIVIDUALS FROM
THE IRAQI FORCES FROM INTERVENING IN FAVOUR OF THE FEDAYEEN AND
THE ATTITUDE OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND THE IRAQI ARMY AT THE
EASTERN FRONT WILL BE DIFFERENT FROM THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE."

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DEFCONCE PASS ROUTINE TO JIS(NE) AND MOD DI4

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MR PHILLIPS.

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129

EN CLAIR
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO. 454


TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 454 DATED 3 SEPT 70 AND
INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV JIS(NE)
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW

THE JORDANIAN REPLY READS AS FOLLOWS:-

" IN REPLY TO THE NOTE RECEIVED BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
YESTERDAY EVENING FROM THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE JORDANIAN
AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD AND THE COMMANDER OF THE SALAH EDDIN FORCES
STATIONED IN JORDAN, THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WISH TO RECORD THAT
THEY BLAME THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR ACCEPTING CLAIMS THAT THE
JORDANIAN ARMY YESTERDAY STRUCK AT THE COMMANDOS AND THAT THE
JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES WERE DETERMINED TO LIQUIDATE COMMANDO ACTION.



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THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED THAT THEY
SUPPORT AND PROTECT COMMANDO ACTION AT ALL TIMES. FOR THIS
REASON, THEY CATEGORICALLY DENY ALL THE CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST
THEM IN THE IRAQI NOTE IN THIS RESPECT.

THE IRAQI NOTE CONTAINED A WARNING TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION BY SOME INDIVIDUALS IN THE IRAQI
FORCES IN FAVOUR OF THE COMMANDOS. THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
DEPLORE THE ADDRESSING OF SUCH A WARNING TO THEM.
THEY CANNOT ACCEPT IT. SIMILARLY, THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT REGRET
THAT, AFTER ALL THIS, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE BROADCAST
THAT THE GRAVITY OF THEIR INTERVENTION YESTERDAY HAD PROMPTED
THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO DESIST FROM OPENING FIRE ON AND
STRIKING AT THE COMMANDOS, ESPECIALLY AS THE FIRING IN THE CAPITAL
HAD CEASED COMPLETELY BEFORE THE RECEIPT OF THE IRAQI NOTE IN
QUESTION AND AS THE ARMY HAS NOT STARTED THE FIRING. IT MERELY
RETURNED THE FIRE AFTER THE OPENING OF FIRE ON THE KING'S MOTORCADE.

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IN CONCLUSION, THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM THEIR STRONG DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE FRATERNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SISTER STATES FREE FROM ALL BLEMISHES."

F C O PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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MOD INTERNAL

3 SEPTEMBER 1978

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NO. 1013

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1978

130

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RECORDED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER
1013 OF 2 SEPTEMBER 1978. RECORDED TO WASHINGTON, NY, LIMA, BAH
REYAD, CAIRO, ISTANBUL, PARIS, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE) AND RECORDED TO
JIS GULF.

124

125

AMMAN TELS. NOS. 449 AND 451 : JORDAN AND IRAQ.

NEJ 114

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERE HAS ALSO RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO
APPROACH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND
HAS PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW RESULTS.

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2. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT I SHALL NOT GET AN APPOINTMENT
WITH VICE-MINISTER VINOGRADOV BEFORE NEXT WEEK (THE AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR IS SEEING HIM THIS AFTERNOON TO MAKE STRONG
REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT U.A.R. IMPOSING TERMS OF CEASE-FIRE
ARRANGEMENTS, AND THESE WILL NO DOUBT KEEP HIM BUSY).
IF SO, I WOULD PROPOSE TO WORK THE SUBJECT OF JORDAN AND IRAQ
INTO A GENERAL TALK RATHER THAN TREAT IT SEPARATELY.

3. WHEN VINOGRADOV SAW BEAM, HE SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO
APPROACH BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.
HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET ESTIMATE HAD BEEN THAT KING HUSSEIN'S
POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE FEDAYEEN HAD RECENTLY IMPROVED, BUT
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT TROUBLE IN AMMAN
MIGHT AFFECT THE PROSPECTS OF ISRAELI-JORDANIAN TALKS UNDER THE
CEASE-FIRE, AND SUGGESTED TO BEAM THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO
EXCHANGE INFORMATION.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, PARIS AND DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONM PLEASE PASS JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

SIR DUNCAN WILSON

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
IMMEDIATE PARIS

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 770

3 SEPTEMBER 1970

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121

IMMEDIATE TO FCO TEL NO. 770 OF 3 SEPTEMBER AND P.F.I.
IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN WASHINGTON U.K.N.Y. NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO
BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO MOSCOW TELAVIV.

YOUR TEL NO. 770 TO AMMAN (NOT TO U.K.N.Y. NEW YORK): JORDAN AND IPAO X/S

FRENCH U.N. REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED
TO SEEK TO CONCERT A FOUR POWER STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE JORDANIAN
POSITION ALONG THE LINES REQUESTED BY KING HUSSAIN (AMMAN TEL. NO.
445 - NOT TO ALL). BACKGROUND TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS.

2. DIRECTEUR AFRIQUE/LEVANT AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY SHOWED ME YESTERDAY,
BEFORE I HAD SEEN AMMAN TEL. UNDER REFERENCE, A SIMILAR TELEGRAM
FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN ABOUT THE KING OF JORDAN'S
APPEAL. DE LEUSSE'S PERSONAL REACTION, WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH
M. ALPHAND BUT NOT YET AT THAT TIME WITH M. SCHUMANN, WAS THAT
THERE SHOULD BE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE JORDANIAN APPEAL FOR
THE FOLLOWING REASONS:-

- (I) IT WAS DESIRABLE TO SUPPORT KING HUSSAIN AT A TIME WHEN HE
MUST BE FEELING PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE AND EXPOSED;
- (II) A CONTINUATION OF TROUBLE IN JORDAN WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING
TO THE PROSPECTS OF THE JARRING NEGOTIATIONS;
- (III) THIS WAS A USEFUL OCCASION TO EMPHASISE THE FOUR POWER
APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM RATHER THAN LEAVING THINGS
TOO EXCLUSIVELY TO THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS.

ACCORDINGLY, DE LEUSSE PROPOSED TO RECOMMEND TO M. SCHUMANN THAT
AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO CONCERT IN NEW YORK A FOUR POWER
STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED THERE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS NEED
NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION IRAQ, BUT WOULD REFER TO CURRENT EVENTS
IN JORDAN AND, WITH NO DOUBT A REFERENCE TO THE APPROPRIATE
ARTICLE OF THE U.N. CHAPTER, WOULD REAFFIRM IN THE NAME OF THE
FOUR POWERS THE NEED FOR ALL CONCERNED TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF

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-2-

OTHER COUNTRIES (OR SOME SIMILARLY APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE). DE LEUSSE SAID THAT THE U.S. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, WHOM HE HAD JUST SEEN IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT, SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER TO MAKE A DIRECT APPROACH TO MOSCOW, URGING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO PRESSURISE THE IRAQIS RATHER THAN GET INVOLVED IN FOUR POWER CONSULTATION ABOUT A STATEMENT. BUT AT THAT TIME DE LEUSSE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS ACTION HAD IN FACT BEEN TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS. IN ANY CASE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN A FOUR POWER FRAMEWORK. HE ASKED ME TO SEEK YOUR VIEWS, IF POSSIBLE, BEFORE HE SAW M. SCHUMANN.

2. AFTER SPEAKING TO YOUR DEPARTMENT, I CONVEYED TO M. DE LEUSSE YOUR REACTION AS IN YOUR TEL. TO AMMAN UNDER REFERENCE AND MADE CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY INSTRUCTED THEIR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO TAKE ACTION. HE THANKED ME FOR THIS INFORMATION. HIS OWN REACTION TO OUR ATTITUDE WAS TO ACCEPT THAT, GIVEN THE APPARENT SOVIET INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, IT MIGHT IN PRACTICE PROVE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR THE RUSSIANS, IF THEY WERE WILLING TO DO SO, TO EXERT PRESSURE DIRECTLY ON IRAQ. NEVERTHELESS, HE CONTINUED TO DISLIKE THE IMPRESSION THAT WAS DAILY GAINING GROUND THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS WERE BEING LEFT TO SORT OUT THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE HEADS OF OTHER POWERS WITH IMPORTANT INTERESTS THERE. MOREOVER, KING HUSSAIN NOT ONLY WANTED THE IRAQIS TO BE CALLED TO ORDER, BUT WAS ALSO SEEKING A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF FOUR POWER CONCERN ABOUT HIS OWN POSITION. WHILE THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN MOSCOW MIGHT GO SOME WAY TO MEET THE FORMER IT DID NOTHING TO SATISFY THE LATTER CONSIDERATION. WHETHER OR NOT THEREFORE, WE WERE RIGHT TO BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AGREEMENT ON A FOUR POWER STATEMENT, HE THOUGHT THAT THE ATTEMPT SHOULD AT LEAST BE MADE.

4. IN CONVEYING TO ME THIS MORNING THE INFORMATION IN PARA. 1 ABOVE, DE LEUSSE CONFIRMED THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN APPROVED BY M. SCHUMANN, WHO AGREED WITH HIS APPROACH TO THE

/PROBLEM

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PARIS TELNO 779 TO FCO

-3-

PROBLEM AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. DE LEUSSE RE-EMPHASISED FRENCH
DISLIKE OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS SEEMED
TO WISH TO TURN THE MIDDLE EAST INTO THEIR OWN "CLOSED SHOP".

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN, ✓ WASHINGTON ✓ AND UKMIS
NEW YORK ✓ AND PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD, ✓ BEIRUT, ✓ CAIRO, ✓ MOSCOW ✓ AND
TEL AVIV. ✓

MR. PALLISER

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SHOULD ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT (AMMAN TELS 445 AND 451), YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE REPORT OF THE MISSION IN NEW YORK ON THE DEPUTIES' MEETING WHICH IS BEING HELD TODAY. THE MISSION ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS (GIVEN BY TELEPHONE) TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH IN THEIR PROPOSAL THAT A STATEMENT SHOULD BE ISSUED UNLESS THE AMERICANS ARE POSITIVELY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS IDEA. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE MISSION WOULD REPEAT THEIR REPORTING TELEGRAM FLASH TO MOSCOW.

4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE HAVE DECIDED NOT TO SPEAK TO THE IRAQIS OURSELVES. WE DO NOT THINK THAT ANY REPRESENTATIONS WE MIGHT MAKE WOULD INFLUENCE THE IRAQIS. IN ANY CASE, THE JORDANIANS HAVE NOT SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT TAKE ACTION OF THIS KIND.
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F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 741

TO MOSCOW

3 SEPTEMBER 1970.
(NE)

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ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELEGRAM NUMBER 741 OF 3 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS BAGHDAD
CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV JIS(NE) JIS(GULF)

(121)

(124)

MY TEL NO. 248 TO AMMAN, AMMAN TEL NO. 449 (BOTH OF WHICH WE
ARE NOW REPEATING IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK) AND PARIS TEL NO. 779:
JORDAN AND IRAQ.

(131)

UNLESS YOU THINK THAT THE TIME FOR USEFUL ACTION HAS PASSED,
WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD NOW SPEAK URGENTLY TO THE
SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

2. WE ARE GREATLY CONCERNED BY THE SITUATION IN JORDAN. IF THE
WORST CAME TO THE WORST, THIS SITUATION COULD LEAD TO A RETRACTION
BY JORDAN OF HER AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS NOW BEING
HELD UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES AND SO TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE TALKS
THEMSELVES. WE ARE PARTICULARLY WORRIED BY REPORTS THAT THE
IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS THREATENED MILITARY INTERVENTION BY IRAQI
FORCES IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE REPORTS ARE NOT HEARSAY.
THEY ORIGINATE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AND FROM BAGHDAD RADIO.
WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL BE READY TO USE ITS INFLUENCE
WITH THE IRAQIS TO CURB THEIR DANGEROUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOUR.
WE RECOGNISE THE DIFFICULTIES. WE KNOW THAT IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO
ACCEPT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 1967 AND HAS
COMMITTED HERSELF TO ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN. WE NEVER-
THELESS HOPE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE
TO ACT IN THE WAY WE HAVE SUGGESTED.

3. IN SPEAKING ABOUT THE JORDANIAN REQUEST THAT THE FOUR POWERS
/SHOULD

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
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IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 587

4 SEPTEMBER 1970



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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 587 OF 4 SEPTEMBER AND R.F.I IMMEDIATE
 TO MOSCOW, UNPIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, CAIRO, AMMAN,
 BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS(NE), JIS (GULF), FOD D14.

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YOUR TELNO 741 TO MOSCOW : JORDAN AND IRAQ.

I AGREE THAT NO REPRESENTATIONS WHICH WE MIGHT MAKE WOULD BE
 LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE IRAQIS. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD BE MORE
 INCLINED TO TAKE SOME ACCOUNT OF A STATEMENT BY THE FOUR FOLDERS.
 REPRESENTATIONS BY THE USSR ARE STILL THE BEST BET, BUT FRENCH
 REPRESENTATIONS COULD HELP.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO UNPIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS
 AND DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE), JIS(GULF) AND FOD D14.

MR. HAWLEY

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO. 455

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 SEPTEMBER 1970

136

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 455 DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, ~~NABUDAH/4~~
JIS(NE), MOD D14, AND NEW YORK.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

PW
719

KING HUSSEIN, IN A RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCAST ON 3 SEPTEMBER
SAID THAT HE HAD COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN HIS GOVERNMENT AND IN THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE HAD ASKED THE GOVERNMENT TO
TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING ORDER, SECURITY AND STABILITY
IN THE CAPITAL. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD ASKED THE CABINET TO CONTACT
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SO THAT THE LATTER COULD ENSURE DISCIPLINE
AMONG ITS CONSTITUENT ORGANISATIONS, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND
THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT COULD TOGETHER ENSURE PUBLIC SAFETY AND
SECURITY.

2. A ROYAL DECREE WAS ISSUED ON 3 SEPTEMBER APPOINTING A PRIVY
COUNCIL COMPRISING:-

ABDUL MUN'IM RIFA'I (F.M.)

SA'ID AL MUFTI (PRESIDENT OF THE UPPER HOUSE)

SULEIMAN AL-NABULSI (FORMER P.M., LEADER OF THE LEFT-WING NATIONAL
GROUPING.

DAHJAT AL-TALHOUNI (FORMER P.M.)

WASFI TEL (FORMER P.M.)

KAMAL AREIQAT (PRESIDENT OF THE LOWER HOUSE)

ZEID RIFAI (CHIEF OF THE ROYAL DIWAN)

AHMED AL-TARAWNEH (SPECIAL ADVISER)

HABIS AL-MAJALI (CHIEF MASTER OF CEREMONIES AND FORMER C-IN-C
ARMED FORCES AND

MASHHOUR HADITHA (CHIEF OF STAFF).

NO INDICATION WAS GIVE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NEW COUNCIL BY THE
OFFICIAL JORDAN NEWS AGENCY.

3. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT AN OFFICIALLY SPONSORED NATIONAL
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN AMMAN IN A FEW DAYS TIME, TO BE ATTENDED
BY "POPULAR ORGANISATIONS, TRADE UNIONS, RELIGIOUS DIGNITARIES

"AND BUSINESS MEN"

AND BUSINESS TEN". A. "COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CHARTER" WILL
DRAWN UP AT THE CONFERENCE.

4. "FATAH" NEWSPAPER THIS MORNING CARRIES A STATEMENT BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WHICH SAYS THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH A GOVERNMENT WHICH DOES NOT EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO CONTROL THE ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES, TO RETURN THE ARMY TO THE FRONT WITH ISRAEL, TO FORGE THE STATE MACHINE, THE ARMY AND THE SECURITY FORCES OF ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO THE REVOLUTION AND THE PEOPLE, AND TO SETTLE ACCOUNTS WITH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOWING DIVISION AMONG THE PEOPLE AND FOR MOBILISING THE ARMY AGAINST THEIR COMRADES IN ARMS. WHEN THIS WAS DONE, THE COMMITTEE WOULD END THE EMERGENCY MEASURES WHICH IT HAD BEEN "ASKED TO TAKE". THE COMMITTEE IS NOT PREPARED, THE STATEMENT ADDS, TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND ARRIVE AT A "MEANINGLESS STATEMENT", WHICH WOULD BE FOLLOWED AFTER A SHORT PERIOD BY THE RESUMPTION OF "MASSACRES" BY THE AUTHORITIES.

5. YASIR ARAFAT ADDRESSED A MEETING OF PARLIAMENTARIANS YESTERDAY AND WAS QUOTED AS SAYING, "WE HAVE HELD MANY MEETINGS WITH THE AUTHORITIES WITHOUT SUCCESS. WE WONDER WHAT USEFUL PURPOSE WILL BE SERVED BY ANY MEETING NOW THAT IT HAS APPEARED THAT THE AUTHORITIES ARE DETERMINED TO MASSACRE THE PEOPLE".

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(IE) AND MOD D14.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO NEW YORK.

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TELEGRAM BAGHDAD
TELNO.586

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 SEPTEMBER, 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 586 OF 4 SEPTEMBER AND REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO, ANNAN, BEIRUT, TEHRAN, KUWAIT,
FAREHAN RESIDENCY, WASHINGTON, UNNIS NEW YORK, USSR, PARIS,
TEL AVIV, JIS(NE), JIS(GULF) AND NOD (D14).

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BY TELNO 586 : IRAQ ARMY IN JORDAN.

THE IRAQI MOTIVE IN ISSUING THE "ULTIMATUM" TO JORDAN OF
1 SEPTEMBER WAS UNDOUBTEDLY TO MAKE THE MAXIMUM POLITICAL CAPITAL
BOTH AT HOME AND AMONG ELEMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD OPPOSED TO A
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THEIR ACTION WAS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BASED ON THEIR
LONG TERM CALCULATION THAT THE ROTTING FRONTS WOULD RUN
INTO THE SANDS AND THEY MAY TO SOME EXTENT HAVE BEEN IMMEDIATELY
INFLUENCED BY HABBASH WHO HAD BEEN HERE A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY.

2. THE IRAQIS SEEK TO HAVE ACTED IN A TYPICALLY INFETUOUS MANNER
AND THE "ULTIMATUM" WAS ACTUALLY DELIVERED BY SHAIKLY,
THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT A LIBYAN EMBASSY RECEPTION
AFTER A HURRIED TELEPHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT BAKR. SUBSEQUENTLY,
HOWEVER, THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO CRITICISE KING HUSSAIN
AND "LIQUIDATIONIST ELEMENTS" HAVE BEEN ATTACKED IN THE
PRESS RATHER THAN THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT PER SE.

3. IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL IF THE IRAQIS SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATE
ENGAGING THE SALAH-UD-DIN FORCE AGAINST THE JORDANIAN ARMY.
IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE LIABLE TO FACE TOO MANY DIFFICULTIES AND
DANGERS INCLUDING POSSIBLE ISRAELI ACTION WERE AN EXTREMIST
GOVERNMENT TO BE SET UP IN ANNAH WITH THEIR SUPPORT. THE
RELIABILITY OF THE SALAH-UD-DIN FORCE MAY ALSO BE SUSPECT.
THE IRAQIS HAVE NONETHELESS OBVIOUSLY BEEN PLAYING WITH FIRE
AND A SITUATION COULD ARISE IN WHICH THE SALAH-UD-DIN FORCE BECAME
ACTIVELY COMMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDOS. IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT ANNAH'S VISIT TO THE FORCE ON 2 SEPTEMBER WAS TO MINIMISE
THIS DANGER SINCE HE IS REPORTED TO FAVOUR CONTINUATION OF KING
HUSSAIN'S REGIME.

4. HOWEVER THE IRAQIS CAN STILL BE RELIED UPON TO CONTINUE SAILING
AS CLOSE TO THE WIND AS THEY DARE.

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FCO TELETYPE IN CRYPTO TO THRU, WASHINGTON, BURLS NEW YORK,
PARIS AND DEFCONICEN.

DEFCONICEN PASS JIS(NE), JIS(GULF) AND MOD (DI4).

MR. HAWLEY

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO FOH 041140Z

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (U.K.)

SEPTEMBER 1970

REF ID: A11510
REC'D IN
REC'D BY NO. 10

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ADDRESSED TO MODUK ARMY TELEGRAM NO FOH 021140Z SEPT 70
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE), JIS GULF, BEIRUT,
TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON.

FROM DA AMMAN.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITUATION AS AT 041000Z SEP.

219.

1. ALTHOUGH SOME SMALL ARMS FIRING WAS REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE DURING NIGHT 3/4 SEP IN THE JEBEL ASHRAFIYA/JEBEL TAJ AREA OF AMMAN FEW SOUNDS OF FIRING WERE HEARD ON JEBEL AMMAN WHERE MOST OF OUR EMBASSY STAFF ARE LOCATED.
2. THIS MORNING TRAFFIC HAS BEEN GENERALLY LIGHT AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED ON A FRIDAY. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF FEDAYEEN ESTABLISHING CHECKPOINTS ON THE ZERQA/AMMAN ROAD AND IN THE STATION ROAD, BETWEEN CENTRAL AMMAN AND THE AIRPORT. EMBASSY STAFF HAVE VISITED THE AIRPORT, USING THE ROAD WHICH BYPASSES THE BUILT-UP PART OF AMMAN TO THE NORTH, AND NO DIFFICULTY WAS EXPERIENCED.
3. FEDAYEEN CAN BE SEEN SITTING IN SLIT TRENCHES BY THEIR WEAPONS AND THIS MORNING IT WAS NOTED THAT SANDBAGS WERE BEING ERECTED ON TOP OF THE HOUSE FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY THE U.S. AMA WHO WAS KILLED IN THE LAST CRISIS. WHEREVER ARMY TROOPS ARE THEY APPEAR TO BE STANDING TO THEIR WEAPONS BUT NO MOVEMENT OF TROOPS NORMALLY STATIONED OUTSIDE AMMAN HAS BEEN NOTICED. WE HAVE HAD A REPORT THAT JOINT MILITARY/FEDAYEEN/CIVIL POLICE PATROLS HAVE BEEN OPERATING BUT HAVE NOT SEEN THEM ON THE GROUND. NO IRAQI TROOPS HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS SEEN IN AMMAN EITHER YESTERDAY OR TODAY.
4. FOR THE SECOND TIME AN EMBASSY C.D. PLATED CAR HAS BEEN STOLEN AT GUN POINT - THIS TIME WITHIN HALF A MILE OF THE EMBASSY. AMERICAN OWNED CARS HAVE ALSO BEEN STOLEN BY FEDAYEEN.

15.

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5. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION ARE REALLY TERRIFIED OF A RECURRENCE OF CLASHES AND THIS MAY WELL HAVE SOME RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON EVENTS NOW THAT IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE SECURITY FORCES ARE READY TO TAKE ANY ARMED ACTION AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED NECESSARY.

6. PERISHABLE FOOD IS ALREADY IN VERY SHORT SUPPLY.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DIA, JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MR. PHILLIPS.

[REPLICATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C]

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CYPHER CAT/A

FLASH PARIS TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 791 OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 791 OF 4 SEPTEMBER AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO UKMIS NEW YORK IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, MOSCOW AND PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD, CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE) AND JIS (GULF).

(140)

YOUR TEL TO UKMIS NEW YORK NO 1105: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

MINISTER SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO DIRECTEUR AFRIQUE/LEVANT AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY.

219

2. M. DE LEUSSE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT YOU HAD EXPRESSED FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. BUT HE DID NOT ACCEPT THAT THE AMERICAN LACK OF ENTHUSIASM AND THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN AGREEMENT WERE, AT THIS STAGE, SUFFICIENT ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY THE FRENCH WITHDRAWING THEIR PROPOSAL. HE CONSIDERED THAT WE OWE IT BOTH TO OURSELVES AND TO KING HUSSAIN TO BE SEEN TO BE RESPONDING TO THE LATTER'S APPEAL AND, IF NECESSARY, TO BE PREPARED JOINTLY TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS TO DO LIKEWISE. HE WAS REINFORCED IN THIS VIEW BY A REPORT FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE REFUSING TO TACKLE THE IRAQIS, AS THE U.S. AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS HAD REQUESTED.

3. ACCORDINGLY, DE LEUSSE IS RECOMMENDING THAT M. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET BE INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO THE CHARGE WITH HIS THREE COLLEAGUES, THOUGH WITHOUT, OF COURSE, GIVING ANY PUBLICITY TO HIS APPROACH. HE ACCEPTED THAT WE WERE PROBABLY RIGHT TO BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE READINESS OF ALL FOUR POWERS TO AGREE A JOINT STATEMENT. BUT HE THOUGHT WE WERE GIVING UP THE STRUGGLE TOO EASILY AND TOO SOON. IN HIS VIEW, (SEE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE) IT WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FOUR POWERS ACTING IN CONCERT IN RESPONSE TO THIS APPEAL FROM ONE OF THE KEY FIGURES IN THE CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

/THAT IT

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THAT IT WAS WORTH RUNNING THE RISK OF PROVOKING SOME TEMPORARY
DISAGREEMENT AT THIS TIME.

F C O PLEASE PASS FLASH TO UKHIS NEW YORK IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON
AMMAN MOSCOW AND PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV
JIS (NE) AND JIS (GULF).

MR SOAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED][SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH TELEGRAM NUMBER 1105

RECEIVED IN

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7 SEP 1970

TO UKMIS NEW YORK

4 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1105 OF 4 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE), JIS (GULF), MOSCOW AND PARIS.

PR
7/9

YOUR TELS NO. 1832, 1833 (NOT TO ALL), 1835 AND 1837 AND MOSCOW TELNO 1016: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

WE SAW MERIT IN THE IDEA OF YOUR SUPPORTING THE FRENCH IN THEIR PROPOSAL BECAUSE WE WISHED TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE JORDANIANS THAT WE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THEIR APPEAL AND BECAUSE WE DID NOT WISH THE FRENCH TO THINK THAT THEIR LINE OF ARGUMENT HAD MADE NO IMPRESSION ON US. BUT WE WERE AT NO TIME OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ALL FOUR POWERS BEING READY TO AGREE THAT A JOINT STATEMENT MIGHT USEFULLY BE ISSUED. IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS ARE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WILL NOT PURSUE IT.

2. IN SPEAKING TO KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE MOTIVES OF THE FRENCH IN PROPOSING THAT THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD CONCERT A JOINT STATEMENT (YOU COULD REFER TO POINTS (I) AND (II) IN PARA 2 OF PARIS TELNO 779). WE CONSIDER, TOO, THAT ACTION BY THE FOUR POWERS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR TERMS OF REFERENCE AS SET OUT IN THE FRENCH MEMORANDUM OF 16 JANUARY, 1969 (FCO TELNO 30 TO PARIS OF THAT DATE). BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE IDEA AND IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE TO ISSUE A STATEMENT IN TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER THREE POWERS. BESIDES, THREE FULL DAYS HAVE NOW ELAPSED SINCE THE JORDANIANS MADE THEIR APPEAL AND ACTION HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS (AND THE FRENCH THEMSELVES) IN CAPITALS IN RESPONSE TO IT. FOR THESE REASONS, WE HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WILL NOT PURSUE THEIR PROPOSAL AND THEREBY RUN THE RISK OF PROVOKING DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FOUR POWERS AT A TIME WHEN IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD ACT IN CONCERT.

3. H.M. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PARIS SHOULD SPEAK TO THE QUAI ON THE

/SAME LINES

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- 2 -

SAME LINES AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

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
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PRIORITY UK111S NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 1844.

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 SEPTEMBER, 1973.



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ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 1844 OF 4 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, CAIRO,
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE), JIS (GULF), MOSCOW AND PARIS.

140

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1145: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

Pan
7/9

I TOOK ACTION THIS MORNING. YOST HAD ALREADY TELEPHONED AND SPOKEN TO
MUCH THE SAME WAY EXCEPT THAT HE HAD LAID STRESS ON THE FACT
THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS WAS A SUITABLE MATTER FOR
THE FOUR POWERS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT YET REPLIED BUT MY FRENCH
COLLEAGUE CONSIDERS THAT THE WHOLE EXERCISE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY
DEAD.

F.C.O. PASS BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE),
JIS (GULF), MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. WARNER.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/ /SENT TO D.C.C./

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CYPHER CAT A
14 SEP 1972
TELEGRAM NO. 1000

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TOP SECRET

142

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSY, NEW YORK, AND THE BRITISH DELEGATION
4 SEPTEMBER 1972

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1. REFERRED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1022
14 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS
NEW YORK, JAPAN, AFRICA, SAUDI, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, JIS
JIS (GULF).

132

YOUR TEL. NO. 741: JORDAN.

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cur
7/9

(MESSAGE IN
REGISTRY)

NET 114

I TOOK ACTION WITH VINOGRADOV THIS AFTERNOON.

2. HE SAID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ALSO VIEWED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH CONCERN: SUCH DIFFERENCES DID NOT SERVE EITHER THE ARAB CAUSE OR THE FOUR POWER QUEST FOR A SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED WITH ANY REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE ANY SUCH MOVE BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS WE HAD SUGGESTED MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED AS INTERFERENCE EITHER BY THE JORDANIANS OR BY THE IRAQIS. TWO DAYS AGO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN OF THE SITUATION, BUT THIS APPROACH DID NOT CONSTITUTE A REQUEST FOR SOVIET ACTION. IN REPLY TO FURTHER PROBING, MR. VINOGRADOV WAS ADAMANT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR ANY KIND OF SOVIET ACTION. HE WAS NOT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION, DRAWING ATTENTION TO JORDANIAN-IRAQI TALKS WHICH, HE SAID, HAD RECENTLY BEGUN: THE PROPOSED MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE IN CAIRO WAS ALSO A GOOD SIGN. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO WATCH THE SITUATION IN JORDAN.

3. I EXPLAINED THAT MY APPROACH WAS BASED PARTLY ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN JORDAN HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT SIMILAR TO THAT RECEIVED BY THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN AMBASSADORS. THIS ENVISAGED A QUADRIPARTITE STATEMENT, AND I BELIEVED THAT THE MERITS OF SOME KIND OF STATEMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK (VINOGRADOV CONFIRMED THIS). IF HOWEVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SAW AN OPPORTUNITY OF URGING MODERATION THEMSELVES ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPED IT WOULD DO SO. /4. MR. VINOGRADOV

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4. MR. VINOGRADOV CLAIMED THAT HE HAD CHECKED WITH MR. BEAM ON 5 SEPTEMBER AND THE LATTER HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE JORDANIAN APPROACH IN AMMAN HAD INCLUDED NO REQUEST FOR ACTION.

5. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO A PREDICTABLE DISCUSSION OF ISRAELI RELUCTANCE TO PROCEED WITH THE JARRING MISSION AND ALLEGATIONS OF CEASEFIRE INFRINGEMENTS. VINOGRADOV LAID EMPHASIS THROUGHOUT ON THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS WITH THE JARRING MISSION.

6. RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

FCO PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND MOD.

MOD PSE PASS JIS (NE) AND JIS (GULF).

SIR DUNCAN WILSON.

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CYPHER CAT/A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 462

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TO F.C.O.
5 SEPTEMBER 1970

143

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 462 DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV BAGHDAD JIS (HE) REFER TO 143
MOD DI 4 AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

7/9

REGIST. NO. 10

NEJ 1/4

THERE WAS SPORADIC AND SOMETIMES QUITE HEAVY FIRING IN MOST AREAS OF AMMAN FROM ABOUT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT UNTIL NEARLY DAWN TODAY. IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT FEDAYEEN OPENED SMALL ARMS FIRE ON JORDANIAN ARMY POSITIONS AND THAT THE ARMY REPLIED WITH HEAVIER WEAPONS. SOME DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED.

2. AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED THIS MORNING SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD INFORMED THE CHIEF OF STAFF THAT HE SHOULD TAKE MEASURES TO RETURN MILITARY UNITS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CAPITAL TO THEIR TRAINING CENTRES IN ORDER TO END MILITARY MANIFESTATIONS NEAR THE CAPITAL AND THE PRESENCE OF ARMED PERSONS FROM VARIOUS ORGANISATIONS IN THE CITY. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WAS FINALLY TO ELIMINATE TENSION IN THE CAPITAL. AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE CONFIDENT OF THE CO-OPERATION OF ALL PARTIES IN SERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND IN RESTORING PEACE AND TRANQUILITY.

3. SOME SHOTS HAVE BEEN HEARD THIS MORNING AND AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT WAS MADE BY FEDAYEEN AT A ROAD BLOCK NEAR THE AIRPORT TO STEAL A CAR DRIVEN BY A BRITISH SUBJECT. BUT CONDITIONS IN THE TOWN ARE MORE NORMAL, WITH MOST SHOPS AND OFFICES OPEN AND PEOPLE RETURNING TO WORK. A JOINT PATROL WAS DUE TO GO ROUND THE TOWN THIS MORNING LOOKING FOR THE CARS STOLEN BY THE FEDAYEEN. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, NOT ACTUALLY SEEN IT.

/4. IN

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- 2 -

4. IN ISSUING THE COMMUNIQUE ABOUT THE RETURN OF UNITS TO TRAINING AREAS (WHICH WILL IN FACT HAVE VERY LITTLE EFFECT ON JORDANIAN FORCES AROUND AMMAN), AND IN AGREING TO ATTEND THE ARAB LEAGUE MEETING, THE GOVERNMENT HAVE GONE SOME WAY TO MEETING TWO OF THE FEDAYEEN CONDITIONS FOR THE RESUMPTION OF TALKS. BUT THE TWO SIDES ARE, STILL A LONG WAY APART AND FURTHER CLASHES ARE STILL POSSIBLE. WE HAVE HOWEVER JUST HEARD FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE P.L.O. MET AFTER THE COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED TO PLAN THE RESUMPTION OF TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO JIS(NE) AND MOD D14.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. PHILLIPS

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CABINET

3 September, 1970

JORDAN

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NET 1/4

Events in Jordan

Clashes between Palestinian commando groups and elements of the Jordan army took place in Amman on 26, 28 and 29 August. On 30 August an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate King Hussain in Amman. There followed several hours of heavy fighting in the town. Fighting flared up again on 1 September. But some kind of cease-fire, which seems to have held reasonably well, came into effect at the end of that day.

International Action

2. The Iraqis have behaved thoroughly mischievously. On 1 September, the Iraqi Ambassador in Amman conveyed a message to King Hussain which demanded an immediate end to action by the Jordan army against the Palestinian commandos and threatened intervention by Iraqi forces in Jordan if this demand was not met. A similar message was conveyed to the Jordan Ambassador in Baghdad. The terms of this latter message were subsequently broadcast by Baghdad radio.

3. The Jordan Government re-acted by asking the Ambassadors of the Four Powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France) in Amman whether their Governments

/would

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would agree to issue a joint statement supporting the Jordan Government and condemning the action of the Iraqis. The State Department decided that it would be pointless to work for a statement of this kind. Instead, they instructed the United States' Ambassador in Moscow and the Head of the United States' Interest Section in Cairo to invite the Russians and the Egyptians to use what influence they had in Baghdad to restrain the Iraqis. Action has been taken on these instructions. According to the State Department the reactions in both Moscow and Cairo were sympathetic.

4. We have asked H.M. Ambassador in Amman whether he thinks that an approach to the Russians by H.M. Ambassador in Moscow would be helpful in terms of British relations with King Hussain and his Government. We await his reply.

British Lives and Property

5. H.M. Ambassador in Amman reported on 2 September that no British subjects had been killed or injured in the fighting. He said that some slight damage had been done to the Embassy building by a shell.

Causes of the Trouble

6. The basic cause of the renewed outbreak of violence is the unstable political situation which exists in Jordan. The immediate cause was probably frustration among many of the Palestinian commandos caused by the acceptance by President Nasser and King Hussain of the United States' proposals of 19 June. We shall probably never know who fired first.

Outlook

7. The situation in Amman seems rather better than it was

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48 hours ago. We can only hope it will continue to improve. We believe that the irresponsible behaviour of the Iraqis has largely been a matter of bravado. Yet there is a risk that Iraqi troops might become involved in fighting. The outlook is not encouraging; in the absence of a political settlement, the situation in Jordan will remain volatile and unstable.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 September, 1970

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO FOH 081120Z

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147
TO MOD UK
SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO MODUK TELEGRAM NO FOH 081120Z SEP 70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO DA'S BEIRUT, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV, JIS(NE) JIS GULF, AND F.C.O.

FROM DA AMMAN.

SITUATION AS AT 081000Z SEPT.

SPORADIC FIRING WAS HEARD FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS IN AMMAN AND FURTHER AFIELD DURING LAST NIGHT. IT IS REPORTED THAT A MORTAR BOMB HIT THE AL URDON HOTEL AT ABOUT MIDNIGHT WHERE THE HIJACKED SWISSAIR AIRCRAFT PASSENGERS WERE STAYING. NO CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED. ANOTHER REPORT IS THAT THE POLICE POST AT THE SUWEILIH CROSSROADS, SOME TEN KILOMETRES NORTH EAST OF AMMAN, WAS SEIZED BY FEDAYEEN DURING THE NIGHT. THE ALTERNATE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT RUNNING NORTH OF AMMAN, IS CLOSED AT PRESENT, BUT THE ROUTE THROUGH THE TOWN IS OPEN. AT ABOUT 0645Z TODAY, A FEW BURSTS OF HEAVY MACHINE GUN AND SMALL ARMS FIRE WERE HEARD FROM THE SPORTS STADIUM AREA IN NORTH EAST AMMAN. WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY JOINT PATROLS OPERATING, BUT, YESTERDAY A FIVE VEHICLE PATROL OF HEAVILY ARMED FEDAYEEN PASSED BY THE EMBASSY. LOUDSPEAKER ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE MADE BY FEDAYEEN ENCOURAGING PEOPLE TO RETURN TO WORK AND STATING THAT ANY FEDAYEEN FOUND FIRING INDISCRIMINATELY WOULD BE DISCIPLINED.

TRAFFIC IS MOVING WELL AT PRESENT AND SHOPS ARE OPEN AS HAS BEEN NORMAL THIS WEEK IN THE MORNING. THERE SEEMS TO BE MORE TENSION ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE TOWN THAN IN IT. THERE HAS BEEN ANOTHER REPORT OF DISTURBANCES IN IRBID AND THE BRANCH THERE OF THE BRITISH BANK OF THE MIDDLE EAST IS BEING CLOSED.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

SENT TO D.C.C./

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148

CIPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO FOH 091015Z

TO MODUK
SEPTEMBER 1970

NEJ 1/4

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ADDRESSED TO MODUK TEL NO FOH 091015Z DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 1970
REPEATED FOR INFO TO DA'S BEIRUT, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV,
JISHE, JIS GULF AND FCO.

10/1

FROM DA AMMAN

JORDAN INTERNAL. SITUATION AS AT 091000Z SEP.

SOME FIRING IS REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE AMMAN STATION AREA DURING THE NIGHT. SHOPS THAT OPENED EARLY IN THE MORNING QUICKLY CLOSED AND BY 090800Z LITTLE TRAFFIC WAS MOVING. LOCAL EMBASSY STAFF HAVE BEEN SENT HOME. A FEW SHOTS HAVE BEEN HEARD BUT THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES GUARDING IMPORTANT POINTS HAVE BEEN ORDERED NOT TO RETURN FIRE UNLESS UNDER IMMINENT ATTACK AND WE CAN CONFIRM THAT OUR EMBASSY GUARDS HAVE RECEIVED THIS ORDER. DA VISITED THE QIADA AT 090630Z BUT NO SENIOR OFFICER WAS AVAILABLE TO PASS ANY INFORMATION ABOUT ANYTHING. HOWEVER, A MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED AT 0900Z THAT THE DMI WISHES TO SEE BOTH BRITISH AND US DA'S SOME TIME THIS AFTERNOON.

2. US DA REPORTS AT 1010Z THAT SPORADIC FIRING HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN THE AREA OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY ON JEBEL LEWEBDI EH FOR SOME TWO HOURS AND THAT US EMBASSY GUARDS HAVE BEEN RETURNING FIRE. A MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY THE US EMBASSY THAT UNLESS THE GUARDS STOP FIRING THE FEDAYEEN WILL QUOTE LEVEL THE EMBASSY UNQUOTE.

3. WE HAVE HAD A REPORT FROM A BRITISH SUBJECT IN THE IRBID AREA THAT HEAVY FIGHTING HAS TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN IN IRBID AND FEDAYEEN HAVE SUFFERED ABOUT FORTY CASUALTIES.

/4. IT

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2.

4. IT SEEMS THAT ON NIGHT 7/8 SEP SOME TROOPS IN THE NA'UR /HOMMER AREA MOVED WITHOUT ORDERS AND WERE STOPPED BY KING HUSSEIN'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD D14, JISNE AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN.

MR PHILLIPS

(SENT TO D.C.C.)

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EN CLAIR
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 474

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

8 SEPTEMBER 1970 101

149

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 474 DATED 8 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD JIS(NE) AND MOD DI4.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10
- 9 -

16/1

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE P.L.O. CENTRAL COMMITTEE THIS AFTERNOON, 8 SEPTEMBER:-

FOR SAFEGUARDING THE SAFETY, SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE OF CITIZENS AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL UNITY IN THE KINGDOM, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING ON TUESDAY, 8 SEPTEMBER.

1. THE IMMEDIATE AND FINAL CESSATION OF SHOOTING.
2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUTHORITIES' DECLARATION OF 5 SEPTEMBER (PARA 2 OF NYTEL 452) IN RETURN FOR IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF AMMAN STREETS, ITS APPROACHES AND MAIN ROADS BY ARMED MEN AND ALL INDIVIDUALS FROM FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS.
3. THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY MANIFESTATIONS AND THE PRESENCE OF ARMED MEN INSIDE THE CITY.
4. THE PROHIBITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH ANY MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES OR OF THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS BY ANY PARTY.
5. THE PROHIBITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH ANY CITIZEN, HIS SAFETY, PROPERTY, OR MONEY BY ANY PARTY. ANYONE WHO COMMITS ANY CONTRAVENTION WILL BE CONSIDERED IN BREACH OF THE LAW, AND WILL BE PUNISHED THROUGH COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
6. THE CESSATION BY ALL QUARTERS OF ALL INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MOBILISATION, WHICH DAMAGE THE NATIONAL INTEREST.
7. THE JOINT COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ENTRUSTED TO IT, INCLUDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE PROVISIONS.

/THIS

THIS STATEMENT WAS ISSUED FOLLOWING A LENGTHY JOINT MEETING HELD ON TUESDAY AT NOON BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION.

2. THE JORDAN NEWS AGENCY REPORTS THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, ABDEL MUNIM RIFAI AND BY YASIR ARAFAT.

3. IT HAS ALSO BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE FOUR-MAN COMMITTEE APPOINTED AT THE RECENT EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE ARRIVED IN AMMAN YESTERDAY EVENING FROM CAIRO. THEY ARE NAMED AS

AMIN SHIBLEY (SUDAN)

OTHMAN SA'ADI (ALGERIA)

OTHMAN NURI (U.A.R.)

SALIM YAFI (SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE)

THEY HELD A MEETING THIS MORNING WITH A NUMBER OF MINISTERS INCLUDING ABDEL MUN'IM RIFAI.

MR PHILLIPS

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CYpher CAT/A

FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 478

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

9 SEPTEMBER

1970

REGISTRY 10

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 478 DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV WASHINGTON NEW YORK JIS(NE) AND MOD DI4.

149

AS THE RESULT APPARENTLY OF AN UNAUTHORISED ATTACK LATE 10/9
 YESTERDAY BY ARMY UNITS ON FEDAYEEN AT IREID IN WHICH MANY OF
 THE LATTER WERE KILLED, THE ARRANGEMENTS REACHED YESTERDAY BETWEEN
 THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE P.L.O. CENTRAL COMMITTEE
 (MY TELEGRAM NO 474 NOT TO ALL) HAVE BEEN DENOUNCED BY THE LATTER
 IN STRONG TERMS (MY I.F.T.), AND THE TOWN IS IN A STATE OF WORSE
 TENSION THAN EVER. SHOPS AND OFFICES HAVE CLOSED AND TRAFFIC
 HAS VIRTUALLY COME TO A STANDSTILL. WE HAVE HAD TO SEND OUR OWN
 LOCAL STAFF HOME.

2. GENERAL MASHHUR HADITHA THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND POSSIBLY THE ONLY HIGHLY PLACED OFFICER WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF BOTH SIDES HAS RESIGNED. EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO MAKE HIM CHANGE HIS MIND BUT HE IS SO FAR ADAMANT.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) AND MOD DI4

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON NEW YORK AND DEFCOMCEN
MR. PHILLIPS

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 479

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
9 SEPTEMBER 1970

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LIST... 10

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 479 DATED 9/9/70 REPEATED FOR INFO
TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, JISDE, AND DIA. NEJ 1/4

MY I.P.T. AND NY TEL NO 474. 149

PC
C

10/5

"FATAH" NEWSPAPER THIS MORNING SAYS THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE P.L.O. HELD A MEETING LAST NIGHT (8 SEPT). IT ISSUED A STATEMENT AFTERWARDS IN WHICH THE COMMITTEE CONDEMNED ACTION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES AGAINST FEDAYEEN BASES, MENTIONING IN PARTICULAR A SERIES OF INCIDENTS IN THE IRBID AREA IN WHICH, THE STATEMENT CLAIMED, THE 46TH ARMOURED DIVISION WAS INVOLVED AND IN WHICH 20 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 40 INJURED. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS THE COMMITTEE HAD DECIDED TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE AGREEMENT REACHED YESTERDAY WITH THE AUTHORITIES (NY TEL UNDER REFERENCE). THE COMMITTEE CALLED UPON THE MASSES TO BE VIGILANT, AND UPON THE JORDAN ARMY TO THWART PLOTS AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND THE RESISTANCE. THE STATEMENT REQUESTS THE FOUR-NAN ARAB COMMITTEE CURRENTLY IN AMMAN TO INVESTIGATE IMMEDIATELY THE "CRIMES OF THE AUTHORITIES", AND CALLS UPON THE ARAB MASSES TO ACT QUICKLY TO PREVENT THE "WAR OF EXTERMINATION" WHICH THE AGENT AUTHORITIES ARE LAUNCHING AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN PEOPLE.

MR. PHILLIPS.

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EN CLAIR
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 486

TO F.C.O. LONDON
9 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 486 DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT AND CAIRO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON
BERNE AND BONN.

NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL.

AMMAN RADIO HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT GENERAL MASHHOUR HADITHA HAS
BEEN GIVEN FULL COMMAND OF THE ARMY WITH AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE
THE INCIDENT AT IRBID YESTERDAY WHEN ARMY UNITS ATTACKED THE
FEDAYEEN.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON BERNE AND BONN.

MR PHILLIPS

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FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO. 2611


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SITUATION IN AMMAN

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION GREENHILL - FREEMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

9 SEPTEMBER 1978



NET 1/4

STATE DEPARTMENT ARE STILL APPARENTLY IN TOUCH WITH AMMAN. THEIR LATEST INFORMATION REPORTS FIRING IN THE STREETS, BUT DOES NOT INDICATE ANY EXCEPTIONAL CRISIS.

2. WHILE I WAS SPEAKING TO JOHNSON AT 1105 WASHINGTON TIME, HE WAS HANDED A FLASH TELEGRAM FROM AMMAN (TIME OF ORIGIN 1420Z) REPORTING THAT AT 1600 HOURS LOCAL TIME B-10C LANDING ON DESERT STRIP WAS EXPECTED AT ANY MOMENT.

3. I HAVE ARRANGED TO KEEP IN CLOSEST TOUCH ABOUT THE GENERAL SITUATION UNTIL OUR COMMUNICATIONS ARE RESTORED. JOHNSON ADDED THAT, IF HE HAD ANY URGENT MESSAGE FOR BRITISH EMBASSY IN AMMAN, THEY WOULD DO ALL THEY COULD TO GET IT THROUGH, THOUGH NATURALLY THEY HOPED TRAFFIC WOULD BE KEPT TO MINIMUM.

4. I AM LEAVING YOU TO REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM AS YOU THINK APPROPRIATE.

MR FREEMAN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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A.& T.D.

AMERICAN D.

N.AFR.D.

S.EUR.D.

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F.U.S.D.

E.EUR.& SOV.D.

ARAB.D.

NEWS D.

EMERGENCY UNIT

COMIS.D.

M.O.D.(INT.)

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155
CYpher/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2620

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
9 SEPTEMBER 1970

REGISTRY-N. 10

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NEJ 1/4

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2620
OF 9 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMEM TEL AVIV
CAIRO BAGHDAD BERNE BONN UKNIS NEW YORK.

BY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PUS: SITUATION IN JORDAN.

PLEASE SEE N 1 P T. WHEN I SAW SISCO THIS AFTERNOON I ASKED HIM
FOR THE LATEST ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AND PUT
TO HIM THE VARIOUS POINTS MENTIONED BY SIR D GREENHILL.

2. SISCO SAID HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT EACH ONE OF THE
SERIES OF CLASHES BETWEEN THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDAYEEN
HAD RESULTED IN A FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE POSITION OF KING HUSSEIN.
THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN CONFIDENT THAT IF THE KING HAD SHOWN
SUFFICIENT RESOLVE IN TACKLING THE PEOPLE OF THE FEDAYEEN, HE
WOULD HAVE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY AND THEY COULD HAVE EXPECTED
A FAVOURABLE OUTCOME FROM ANY CONFRONTATION. UNFORTUNATELY,
HOWEVER, THE KING'S ACTIONS IN RECENT WEEKS HAD BEEN WEAK AND
WICHLATING. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE, THEREFORE, LESS CERTAIN
ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TODAY. IN A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE
STILL THOUGHT THAT IF THE KING SHOWED SUFFICIENT DETERMINATION AND
RESOLVE THE RESULT WOULD BE FAVOURABLE TO HIM.

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3. SISCO SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD LEFT IT TO THE KING TO PLAY THE HAND AS HE THOUGHT BEST EVEN WHEN THEIR PRIVATE JUDGEMENT WAS CONTRARY TO WHAT HE WAS DOING. THEY HAD IN MIND THAT IF THEY WERE TO GIVE ADVICE THEY WOULD TAKE ON A CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITY. ALSO THEY WERE MOST ANXIOUS NOT TO CREATE A SITUATION WHICH MIGHT CONFRONT THEM WITH DIFFICULT DECISIONS ABOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION. FURTHERMORE, IF KING HUSSAIN WERE TO REACH A POSITION IN WHICH HE FELT HE COULD ONLY BE KEPT IN POWER BY U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION THE RESULTS OF ANY SUCH DIRECT US SUPPORT COULD ONLY BE TEMPORARY AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF ANY MOVE OF THIS KIND WOULD BE BOUND TO MAKE THE CURRENT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE AREA MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. IN ANY EVENT THE US GOVERNMENT WERE CONCERNED THAT THE PRESENT CRISIS, EVEN IF IT HAD A FAVOURABLE OUTCOME, WOULD BE BOUND TO COMPLICATE THE PEACE EFFORTS. THE ISRAELIS MIGHT ASK WHOM THEY WOULD BE MAKING PEACE WITH IN JORDAN; THEY MIGHT REASONABLY INSIST THAT THEY COULD ONLY REACH AGREEMENT WITH SOMEONE WHO COULD MAKE THE AGREEMENT STICK.

4. I EXPLAINED TO SISCO THE CURRENT POSITION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. SISCO SAID THAT AS THINGS WERE AT PRESENT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ORDERED A FURTHER EVACUATION FROM JORDAN. THEIR EMBASSY DEPENDENTS WERE ALREADY OUT OF THE COUNTRY AND HE HAVE SINCE BEEN TOLD BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THERE MAY BE ONLY ABOUT 50 OTHER NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL WHO MIGHT NOW WISH TO LEAVE. SISCO ADDED THAT ONE DIFFERENCE FROM PREVIOUS CRISES IN JORDAN WAS THAT THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS NOW WAS ON THE CLASH BETWEEN THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDAYEEN AND SO FAR THERE WAS VERY LITTLE POLITICAL ATTACK ON THE U.S. THOUGH THIS SITUATION COULD CHANGE QUICKLY. ALSO, THE US GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE WHOLE SITUATION OF THE U.S. EMBASSY ORDERING AN EVACUATION NOW. SISCO SAID THAT THEY NEVERTHELESS WELCOMED THE PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WE HAVE HAD WITH THE RED CROSS.

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6. SISCO RECALLED ON TO SAY THAT ON A PURELY PRECAUTIONARY AND CONTINGENCY BASIS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN LOOKING AT WHAT THEY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DO IF THERE WERE A RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION, I.E. IF IT GOT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF EVACUATION BY COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS POSSIBLY ASSISTED BY THE RED CROSS. THEY HAD REVIEWED THEIR CONTINGENCY PLANS THIS MORNING AT A MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE AND THEY HAD BEGUN CERTAIN PRECAUTIONARY STEPS: (1) SIX C. 130 AIRCRAFT WITH MEDICAL TEAMS HAD BEEN MOVED TO A U.S. BASE IN TURKEY (THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPKESMAN HAS NOW ANNOUNCED THIS PUBLICLY);

(2) THEY HAD CONSIDERED WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO EVACUATE THE REMAINING U.S. PERSONNEL FROM AMMAN AND OTHERS. SISCO STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT: QUOTE 'WE HAVE PUSHED NO BUTTONS WHATSOEVER OTHER THAN THE MOVEMENT OF THE C 130'S. UNQUOTE.

7. SISCO SAID THAT WHAT CONCERNED HIM MOST ABOUT THE SITUATION IN JORDAN WAS THAT IF KING HUSSEIN WERE OVERTURNED, THIS WOULD BE FOUND TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE ON-GOING PEACE EFFORT. IT WAS AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER THERE WOULD BE DIRECT IRAQI INTERVENTION WHICH IN TURN WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD DO IF JORDAN WERE ON THE BRINK OF A FEDAYEEN TAKE-OVER. THE CURRENT AMERICAN ASSESSMENT (WITHOUT DIRECT EVIDENCE) WAS THAT IN THIS SITUATION THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY TEMPTED TO INTERVENE. THOSE LONGER-TERM SPECULATIONS APART, IT WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION IN AMMAN IS (OR WAS THIS AFTERNOON) SLIGHTLY LESS ALARMED THAN OURS.

ECO PASS IMMEDIATE ATTAIN PRIORITY TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD DERNE DAKK.
MR. FREEMAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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AMER CAT/A
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 489

TO F.C.O.
10 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 489 (100700Z) SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UK IS N.Y. ECNL FCD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NO.1.

pr
1315

SITUATION AT 100700Z.

FIRING RESTARTED IN AMMAN IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON YESTERDAY AFTER DISTANT CUMFIRE HAD BEEN HEARD FROM THE ZERKA AREA LEYOND THE AIRPORT ON THE ZERKA ROAD. UNTIL ABOUT 2200 HOURS LOCAL TIME FIRING WAS QUITE HEAVY FROM MORTARS (PRESUMABLY FEDAYEEN) AND SEEMED TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS.

ZAHRAH PALACE, JEBEL A'MAN, H.Q. JORDAN ARMED FORCES, EASTAN PALACE, JEBEL HUSSEIN, POST OFFICE AND TELEPHONE EXCHANGE.

LITTLE ACTIVITY WAS REPORTED AS BEING SEEN IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE WAHDAT REFUGEE CAMP OR NEARBY JEBEL ASHRAFIYA. FEDAYEEN WERE REPORTED AS ATTACKING IN RETALIATION FOR THE ACTION OF GOVERNMENT FORCES IN THE IRBID AREA ON 8 SEPTEMBER. NO INTERVENTION BY IRAQI FORCES IS REPORTED. CHANCERY AND HOUSES OF EMBASSY STAFF HAVE RECEIVED SOME HITS AND SUFFERED DAMAGE BUT NO REPEAT NO CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED AGAINST BRITISH COMMUNITY.

AFTER RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS BY GENERAL FASHUR HADITHA, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE FIRING DIED DOWN. THE NIGHT WAS QUIET UNTIL ABOUT 0530 LOCAL TIME WHEN SOME SHOTS WERE HEARD ON JEBEL A'MAN. SPORADIC SMALL ARMS FIRE BREAKS OUT INTERMITTENTLY NOW. EMBASSY STAFF ARE STAYING IN THEIR HOUSES FOR THE PRESENT LESS A SKELETON STAFF IN THE CHANCERY BUILDING.

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THE AIRPORT IS DEFENDED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION TO BE GONE TO RECEIVE FLAMES AS FOR AL AND THE ORIGIN FLIGHT FROM LEBUT IS EXPECTED. VERY LITTLE TRAFFIC IS MOVING AND TRAVEL TO THE AIRPORT CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE RISKED.

FCC PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN PARIS PERME BORN WASHINGTON AND
URGENT NEW YORK

MR. PHILIPS.

(SENT TO D.C.C.)
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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The situation continued in this manner until about 22.50 when DPFLP elements used loudspeakers to ask the elements in the building to lay down their arms, to surrender, and to evacuate the building or the building would be destroyed. They fired three rockets at the building about 23.00. The exchange of heavy fire continued until midnight when more Public Security, Palestine Liberation Army and PASC forces arrived - this following appreciated effort by the Central Committee of the Resistance.

(2) It is regrettable that the DPFLP referred in its bulletin to those in the building as the enemy when in fact they were brothers in arms consisting of Public Security and PASC elements. It is also regrettable that the DPFLP threatened to kill them when it is supposed to use its weapons and courage against those occupying the homeland and desecrating it, not against these brothers to whom the DPFLP is supposed to be linked by ties of battle, aims and future.

(3) The authoritative source at the Ministry of the Interior expresses great thanks and appreciation to the Central Committee of the Resistance and to the PASC and PLA elements. Their efforts contributed decisively to the containment of this regrettable incident and to its termination as soon as possible. The source hopes that everyone will work to enhance confidence and co-operation between the sons of the one people in view of their fraternity and common unity of aim and future. It also hopes that everyone will refrain from doing anything which can aggravate differences or cause a clash among the forces of the one battle. No one can benefit from this except our one enemy, Israel, Zionism and world imperialism.

King Husayn's Broadcast of 29th August

Amman home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 29.8.70

Excerpts from King Husayn's broadcast (from a recording):

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate. Brother citizens, brother Arabs everywhere, I have not spoken to you for a long time. During this time, there have been events and developments concerning us and our affairs as well as the common Arab situation. My talk to you today is a frank one dictated by patriotic feeling emanating from reality...

We have found that our struggle against aggression is a long one and has numerous aspects involving politics as much as war. It has an international as well as a national character. We therefore accepted the recent US plan for talks with the UN envoy for the purpose of implementing UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 1967 for various reasons:

(1) We are working hand in hand with our great sister the UAR in our persistent and long effort. We accept things together and reject things together.

(2) The US initiative known as the Rogers proposals is an invitation to enter into talks with the UN envoy for the purpose of implementing the UN Security Council resolution which we, the UAR and a number of fraternal Arab countries have long demanded should be implemented.

(3) In our demand that the Security Council resolution should be implemented, we start from two principles which, in our view, are the most important bases for implementation of the Security Council resolution. These form our only interpretation of the resolution: Israel's complete withdrawal from all Arab areas occupied after 5th June 1967 and the safeguarding of the full rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their usurped homeland.

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(iv) The Council calls on all anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist Arab States to extend effective support to the forces of the armed Palestine revolution and to pay their commitments to the Palestine National Fund.

(v) The Council calls on the Arab people in all the Arab countries to struggle against imperialist interests and positions and against the agents of colonial imperialism. We believe the struggle against imperialism in the Arab countries constitutes support for the Palestine revolution, part of the Arab revolutionary movement.

(4) (a) Since the armed Palestine Resistance is part of the world liberation movement and the world revolution against imperialism, we appeal to all the liberation forces everywhere to support our people's legitimate struggle for the liberation of their country.

(b) The Palestine National Council requests the PLO Central Committee and all its establishments and organs to conduct worldwide information efforts and to make direct contact with all the national liberation and progressive movements and regimes to explain the position of the Resistance in rejecting the capitulation solutions, to explain the need to continue the revolution, and to refute all propaganda aimed at distorting this attitude. The Council stresses the importance of information at this stage, whether directed to our Palestinian people in the occupied land, to Arab people everywhere, or the world. Giant information media of several foreign and Arab States are at present putting out propaganda harmful to the Palestine cause. This propaganda is aimed primarily at our Palestinian Arab people. It seeks to embellish the capitulation solutions, distort the image of fida'i action, and subsequently to confuse the people and weaken their attitude. This stresses the importance of revolutionary information at this stage. Hence, the Council considers it necessary to resume transmission from the Voice of Palestine radio, organ of the PLO; to unify all the revolutionary information media; and to conduct every possible information activity.

Jordanian Statement on Amman Clashes of 28th August

Amman home service in Arabic 17.00 GMT 29.8.70

Text of Ministry of the Interior statement:

In today's issue 'Ash-Shararah', publication of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, reports that fire was opened by the Jordanian authorities at a number of militia members distributing pamphlets near the automatic exchange building in Amman. 'Ash-Shararah' says that two strugglers were killed and others wounded, and that the Resistance forces who arrived at the scene were able to silence enemy sources of fire and to occupy the post office. The report concluded by saying that the enemy would not escape punishment and that the revolution's hand would reach them wherever they might be.

An authoritative source at the Ministry of the Interior would like to make the following comment on this report:

(1) The truth about the incident is summed up as follows: Armed elements of the DPFLP wanted to put a poster on one of the walls of the automatic exchange building at about 20.30 yesterday. An argument ensued between them and the guard of the building who asked them not to put the poster on the wall. They replied that they would put the poster up by force of arms. Hardly had they moved away from the guard when elements opened fire at the building from nearby roofs and alleys. This forced the guard to take cover behind the western gate of the building. Security elements inside the building asked for help from the police department, and the police department contacted the headquarters of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command. When the firing became heavy, the elements in the building, including a number of PASC elements, were forced to return the fire.

(4) In the international community to which we belong and among the great world Powers which cannot be ignored, there are those who support us and even share the armed struggle with us. This struggle is against aggression and to recover and save our rights, by either political or military means. It will last until we recover all our areas occupied in June 1967 and safeguard the Palestine people's rights to their usurped homeland. These rights have been approved by the UN a number of times and by international conventions and principles of right and justice. We cannot neglect these rights in the least. The rights we seek are the rights of our people to their homeland, land and homes from which they were expelled by invasion and aggression.

(5) We accepted the US initiative because of the serious interest in the issue shown by the United States and the Soviet Union, the two great Powers primarily concerned with the dangerous situation in our area resulting from the Arab-Israeli dispute and its menace, which threatens the world with a terrible and destructive explosion. We also accepted because of the concentration by these Powers on the causes of tension and the sources of menace to world peace.

In view of this Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the UN envoy in charge of implementation of the UN Security Council resolution, began his contacts with the two sides for this purpose. At the beginning we appointed our UN delegate to engage in the preliminary talks.

It is your right, brother citizens, to know the progress of these talks and to know of any new development concerning these talks, whether negative or positive. We shall miss no opportunity to acquaint you with this...

As for the comrades of our march, foremost of whom are our brethren in the fraternal UAR under the leadership of its Arab struggler President Jamal Abd an-Nasir, they are the strongest of all Arabs and have made the most sacrifices on the road of struggle for the sake of all the Arabs and for the Palestine Arab people. Certainly, there is no hope of realising our national aims if they are not the vanguard of those working for those aims, as they have always been. There is no room to deny this. No balanced, sober, sincere and wise man can minimise their attitudes and sacrifices, or ours, particularly if he probes the depths of reality.

Henceforth we shall not, in any circumstances, accept the responsibility of losing Palestine for unforeseeable generations and abandon our people there because of reluctance to knock at any door leading to the liberation of all our occupied land and the rescue of our people. We shall stand proudly and firmly against any arrogance and outbidding. Nothing can make us abandon our duty except death, which we prefer to contravening the dictates of our conscience.

Dear people, this political move made by us and the UAR has created a negative reaction in a number of fraternal Arab countries and in the Palestine Resistance organisations. These quarters have regarded this move as following a peaceful course incompatible with the course of armed struggle. We have explained beyond any doubt that, in reality, we are the vanguards of this armed struggle, its concept (Arabic: madmun) and weapon, whether others like it or not. In our efforts in various fields, we are working to recover the occupied land, liberate our people there and save the Holy City from aggression. Therefore we shall not allow the hated aggression to turn into a fait accompli due to the lapse of time...

Following the events of June 1967, the effect of the Zionist aggression, the danger of the Israeli war machine to the Arab destiny and cause, and the Arab duty to confront and crush that danger dictated unification of the Arab military effort under a single general command. The command was entrusted to the most efficient and capable Arab officer, General Muhammad Fawzi, the War Minister and C-in-C of the UAR armed forces. He was given command of the western and eastern fronts...

However, when it was noticed that the accomplishments of the eastern front and the state of affairs there - the supreme and common interest - necessitated reconsideration of the eastern front question to ensure the best possible form of command and control of all Arab military forces, arrangements were approved as recommended by the General Commander at the recent Tripoli meeting of the Defence Council of front line States. These provided for dissolution of the eastern front and for the exercise by the General Commander of duties and control, through a command comprising picked staff officers representing the Arab forces, over three fronts: the western UAR front, the northern front in the Syrian Arab Republic and the eastern Jordanian front. They also provided for the deployment of all the Arab forces on the territory of any of the three States and under the orders of that command. In addition to the advantages of this arrangement, it is the natural right of each direct command since it is the owner of the land for the safety of which it is directly responsible and since it is also responsible for it to the General Commander.

New negative attitudes reflected deeply and adversely on these arrangements, necessitating immediate action to establish a new arrangement to regulate the military ties between us and fraternal Arab armed forces deployed on our territory, especially the dear Iraqi armed forces. This was necessary to serve the general Arab military effort. We are now discussing this and hope for success...

We feel sad to read in the fida'i papers and to see signs that the Resistance imagines there might be a clash with the State authorities and so is preparing itself for this imaginary clash. Whenever our armed forces move about the capital or any town or village for any reason, the Resistance portrays the movement as having been directed against it. It is as though the army had no right to move near towns. This is the army of the people, the country's shield and the nation's strong hope. It has an absolute right to move anywhere throughout our land.

The Resistance papers and bulletins often contain accusations against us, raise doubts about us and attack and insult us. We choose not to answer them, believing that if we strike back we shall hit a force which we want to see as a growing force for the struggle, a force which comes from us and is for us. Were it not for this, we would not have tolerated any such undermining of the State, insults to the Government, slandering of the Army and intimidation of the people.

In all our past and present sacrifices and in our past and present actions, our consciences and our heads have been held high. We do not seek recognition from anyone because we are defending our country, our rights and our people. But we tolerate neither insults nor slanders from anyone. Neither do we tolerate efforts to show super-patriotism - efforts which soon dwindle in the race to do patriotic (Arabic: wataniyah) service and national (Arabic: qawmi) action.

Honourable people, Arabs everywhere, the phase through which we are passing now is so critical, important and serious that it requires the highest and most perfect Arab awareness. Whenever there is a difference of opinion between one group of us and another on how to face the occupying enemy and wrest our rights from the grip of the aggressors, we must always remember that every action is permissible except one: our efforts should not be scattered or diverted from confronting the enemy into confrontations within our own ranks.

The Arabs are shamed if they turn against one another when their future and all their aspirations are in danger. Perhaps it is our right to expect their absolute support for our common effort, which is in their own interests first and last.

On the other hand, especially in this critical situation, we declare that in the event of any attempt to undermine the tower of our steadfastness or national unity or to harm our citizens or undermine our existence, we shall do our duty of placing matters in their proper perspective. We have been doing that since we assumed responsibility in our country...